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TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE
EDWARD LEE*
ABSTRACT
This Article proposes a framework tailoring the fair use doctrine
specifically for technology cases. At the inception of the twenty-first
century, information technologies have become increasingly central to the
U.S. economy. Not surprisingly, complex copyright cases involving speech
technologies, such as DVRs, MP3 devices, Google Book Search, and
YouTube, have also increased. Yet existing copyright law, developed long
before digital technologies, is ill prepared to handle the complexities that
these technology cases pose. The key question often turns not on prima
facie infringement, but on the defense of fair use, which courts have too
often relegated to extremely fact-specific decisions. The downside to this ad
hoc adjudication of fair use is that it leads to an uncertainty over what is
permissible that may impede innovation in speech technologies. This
Article addresses this ongoing problem by proposing that courts recognize
a specific type of fair use—technological fair use—and tailor the four fair
use factors accordingly. Technological fair use is supported not only by a
synthesis of existing case law and economic theory, but also, more
importantly, by the constitutional underpinnings of the First Amendment
and the Copyright and Patent Clause.
I. INTRODUCTION
In our Information Age, a new form of fair use is emerging. It
involves not just individual uses of copyrighted works, but also the
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; Visiting Professor of
Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A. 1992, Williams College; J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School.
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development of new speech technologies.1 Cases involving these
“technological fair uses”2 are often far more complex and significant to the
U.S. economy than traditional fair use cases. At stake is not just the legality
of certain uses of copyrighted works, but also, quite often, the legality of
new technologies that can have a profound impact on innovation and the
growth of the U.S. economy, as well as on people’s daily lives.
Consider Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
perhaps the mother of technological fair use.3 At stake in Sony was the
legality of not only the new consumer practice of taping television shows at
home for later viewing (known as “time-shifting”), but also the sale of an
entire line of the then-new technology known as the VCR.4 Several movie
studios sought to ban VCRs so they could market their own approved
videodisc player that did not offer consumers the ability to record television
broadcasts.5 Ultimately, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,6 held that
1. By “speech technology,” I mean any technology that functions in creating, displaying, or
disseminating speech. How far to apply this definition may present some difficult questions, at least on
the margins. Without running through the myriad possibilities, I believe all of the key copyright cases
discussed in this Article fall within the definition of speech technology in a way that most people will
find uncontroversial. For those cases that are more difficult, social norms may help shape what is
viewed as a technology. For example, the technology may have become so commonplace—e.g., printed
books and picture frames—that people no longer view it as a technology. Yet the technology may later
become more advanced—e.g., digital books and digital frames—so that it becomes viewed again as a
technology. For simplicity, I do not at this time include technologies, such as digital rights management,
that function to stop the creation, display, or dissemination of speech within my definition. Although
such antispeech dissemination technologies are related to speech, they have not yet raised cases
involving the assertion of fair use as justifications for the creation of those technologies.
2. “Technological fair use” is a term that I have coined to describe a subset of fair use cases
dealing with technologies. Courts have yet formally to adopt this terminology, although a synthesis of
the fair use cases in this area supports my approach.
3. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
4. Id. at 420–21. The Court described Sony’s Betamax as a “video tape recorder,” or “VTR.” Id.
at 420. This type of machine eventually became commonly known as the “VCR,” or “video cassette
recorder.”
5. Id. at 421–22. Music Corporation of America, which owned Universal Studios and had
developed the competing videodisc player that did not have recording capability, orchestrated the
lawsuit to stop the Sony Betamax by having Universal file the lawsuit, with Disney joining the suit as a
coplaintiff against Sony. See JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE
ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 26–30, 119, 316–28 (1987); WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE
COPYRIGHT WARS 149–50 (2009); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 401 &
n.522 (2008) [hereinafter Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0].
6. Initially, a majority of the Court took the opposite view (against Sony) in its conference
following oral argument. For fascinating accounts of the Court’s internal shift in Sony, see Jessica
Litman, The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 358, 366–82 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds.,
2006). See also Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek Behind the
Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427 (1993) (tracing the
development of the Sony case through the use of Justice Thurgood Marshall’s public papers).
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home time-shift recordings were a permissible fair use and that the VCR
was perfectly legal because the technology was capable of “substantial
noninfringing uses.”7
Had the Court decided the other way and upheld a ban on VCRs, the
world today would be vastly different. The fifteen years following the Sony
decision saw sales of VCRs in the millions, with 88.6 percent of all U.S.
households owning a VCR by 1999.8 Indeed, the growth rate in sales of
VCRs eclipsed the past rate of market penetration of color televisions.9
Hollywood’s preferred technology over the VCR, the (nonrecording)
laserdisc, flopped.10 But the sale of VCRs in turn facilitated the growth of a
vast new and unforeseen market for the movie studios in the rental and sale
of videos for home viewing, which, perhaps ironically,11 became “the
largest source of revenue for the [U.S.] movie industry,” even surpassing
box office sales.12 In fact, the major Hollywood studios benefited the most
from the burgeoning home video market.13 Today, videos on DVD, the
successor to the VCR home market, “generate[] more than double the
revenues collected at the box office.”14 The VCR also facilitated a new
7.
8.

Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
81.2% of US Households Have DVD Players, 79.2%—VCR Machines, IT FACTS, Dec. 20,
2006, http://www.itfacts.biz/812-of-us-households-have-dvd-players-792-vcr-machines/7871 (citing
NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH, 3RD QUARTER HOME TECHNOLOGY REPORT (2006)). During the eight
years that it took to resolve Sony (1976–1984), the number of VCRs in U.S. households rose
exponentially, from 475,000 to 5 million. Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
433, 439 (2008). Most of the VCRs were made by foreign manufacturers. 1990 U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 47-5 [hereinafter 1990 OUTLOOK].
9. See ELEC. MARKET DATA BOOK 16–17 (Elec. Indus. Ass’n 1990) [hereinafter 1990 DATA
BOOK].
10. See ELEC. MARKET DATA BOOK 21 tbl.2.2 (Elec. Indus. Ass’n 1993) (stating that in 1992
sales of VCRs exceeded 12 million, while sales of laserdiscs were only 212,000, or just 1.8 percent of
VCR sales).
11. The VCR’s huge financial boon to the movie industry made laughable the dire predictions of
Motion Picture Association of America president Jack Valenti, who testified before Congress about the
dangers that these recorders posed to the motion picture industry, warning that “the VCR is to the
American film producer and the American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”
Litman, supra note 6, at 365. See also PATRY, supra note 5, at 144–54 (describing Valenti’s testimony
that the VCR would threaten both the motion picture industry and the American public).
12. Edward Lee, The Ethics of Innovation: p2p Software Developers and Designing Substantial
Noninfringing Uses Under the Sony Doctrine, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 147, 148 (2005). In 1988, just five
years after Sony, video rentals and sales totaled $11.3 billion in the United States, a 51 percent increase
from 1987. See 1990 OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 47-5.
13. See 1990 OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 47-6 (“52 percent of all industry sales were garnered by
the top five U.S. suppliers; some independents and smaller distributors went out of business, while
others were beset by increasing difficulties.”).
14. Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 840–41
(2008).
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market for camcorders and video cameras; sales for these products doubled
within a decade.15 Thus, had Sony been decided the other way, literally
billions of dollars in revenue in these three new markets (VCRs, video
rentals/sales, and video cameras) might never have materialized—
consumer spending on rentals and sales of videotapes and DVDs alone
totaled a staggering $343.2 billion between 1981 and 2006.16 As this single
example suggests, technological fair use cases may be far weightier than
other fair use cases, at least in terms of dollar amounts and their effect on
the U.S. economy.17
The question of technological fair use is not merely a relic of the past.
Although VCRs are headed toward obsolescence, technological fair use is a
doctrine relevant to some of the most innovative speech technologies in
recent years, such as Google’s Book Search and Amazon’s Kindle. Both
technologies offer great benefits to the public. For example, Google’s Book
Search, an online search tool, enables people to search within the texts of
15. See 1990 OUTLOOK, supra note 8, at 45-7. From 1992 to 2001, camcorders doubled in sales
to more than 5 million. See ELEC. MARKET DATA BOOK 16 (Elec. Indus. Ass’n 2002) (citing eBrain
Market Research). The VCR facilitated the camcorder market because “[c]amcorders [were] purchased
primarily by consumers who already own[ed] home VCR decks and [we]re interested in a simple to use,
lightweight portable for electronic photography.” 1990 DATA BOOK, supra note 9, at 17.
16. Entertainment Merchant Association, Consumer Spending—Rental & Sell-Through: VHS &
DVD Combined 1981–2006, http://www.entmerch.org/adams_research.html (last visited May 1, 2010)
(citing Adams Media Research). See also 2000 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE U.S.: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK 566 tbl.909 (reporting data on consumer spending on home
video from 1993 to 2003); 1995 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: THE
NATIONAL DATA BOOK 572 tbl.899 (reporting data from 1985 to 1993).
17. Apple’s iPod provides another example of a type of speech technology that has generated
considerable revenues supported by fair use—the device produced over $13 billion in revenue in its first
five years. Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 838. Along with the popular iTunes music download
service, the iPod has helped to facilitate the growth of the market for digital downloads. By January
2009, Apple had sold 6 billion songs, selling roughly 2 billion songs per year. Paul Resnikoff, What
Else? iTunes Store Hits 6 Billion . . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS, Dec. 29, 2009,
http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/stories/010609what. This figure does not include the growing
download video market. My sense is that most people think that transferring one’s purchased music
from CDs onto an iPod would constitute fair use, and most copyright commentators would likely also
agree. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 837 (explaining how “there would be no iPod if Apple
could not count on copyright law to permit iPod buyers to copy their existing CD collections”). See also
Lawrence Lessig, A Rotten Ruling, WIRED, Sept. 2005, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.09/
posts.html?pg=7 (explaining that Apple knew when developing and promoting the iPod that people
would copy music from CDs). Yet the Recording Industry Association of America has not embraced
that view, instead characterizing such transfers as simply permitted by the music industry. Ass’n of Am.
Publishers et al., RM 2005-11, Joint Reply Comments 22 n.46 (Feb. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/reply/11metalitz_AAP.pdf (presenting comments following
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,526 (Oct. 3, 2005), arguing that routine permission to
make a copy does not “necessarily establish that the copying is a fair use when the copyright owner
withholds that authorization”).
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the many millions of books scanned by Google and participating libraries.18
Also, Amazon’s Kindle, an e-book reader, has a “text-to-speech” capability
that allows automated voice narration of electronic books,19 a function that
is especially useful for the blind, visually impaired, and those with learning
disabilities.20 While both of these technologies have the capability of
providing benefits to the public, their claims of fair use remain uncertain
and unresolved. Other emerging speech technologies are likely to face the
same problem.
Despite the importance of fair use involving technologies, our
understanding of technological fair use is thin. Courts have not formally
recognized the concept of “technological fair use,” even though several
important fair use cases have involved a similar type of intersection
between a fair use and the development of a technology.21 The case law
remains, as it does generally for fair use, ad hoc.22 Moreover, none of the
purposes or factors in the fair use provision in the Copyright Act
specifically addresses how the development of a new speech technology
should be considered, if at all, in the fair use analysis.23 Although Congress
recognized the likelihood that “rapid technological change” would affect
fair use when it enacted the Copyright Act in 1976, it did not want “to
freeze the doctrine in the statute.”24 Instead, Congress thought it better to
leave fair use to case-by-case development.25
18. See Google Books, About Google Books, Overview, http://books.google.com/intl/en/
googlebooks/about.html (last visited May 2, 2010).
19. See Posting of Brad Stone to N.Y. Times Bits, (Feb. 27, 2009, 18:51 EST),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/27/amazon-backs-off-text-to-speech-feature-in-kindle/. Text-tospeech functionality is not limited to e-book readers. For example, both Adobe and Apple have text-tospeech software capability for text documents and, in the case of Apple, even for HTML documents and
Web pages. See Adobe, Section Two: Using the Read out Loud Text-to-Speech Tool,
http://www.adobe.com/enterprise/accessibility/reader6/sec2.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2010); Apple,
iSpeak It 3.5.1, http://www.apple.com/downloads/macosx/ipod_itunes/ispeakit.html (last visited May 1,
2010).
20 See Danny O’Brien, Disabled Must Be Given Equal Digital Rights, IRISH TIMES, May 22,
2009, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2009/0522/1224247099810.html. See
also Reading Rights Coalition Denounces Random House, READING RIGHTS COAL., May 20, 2009,
http://www.readingrights.org/453.
21. See infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
22. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not to be
simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case
analysis.” (citations omitted)).
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (outlining the fair use provision).
24. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5680 (“The bill
endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no disposition to
freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change.”).
25. See id. (“Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the
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Congress’s decision to grant courts the authority to develop the
doctrine through common law adjudication was sensible at the time. More
than thirty years later, however, courts appear to have misunderstood this
broad authority to fashion and further develop the fair use doctrine as a
straitjacket that permits only very fact-specific decisions applying, almost
by rote, the four statutory fair use factors.26 Over the past thirty years,
courts have provided greater ex ante guidance to the public on what
specifically constitutes fair use in only three different types of fair use
situations—time-shift recordings of television shows in the home,27 reverse
engineering to achieve interoperability,28 and parody fair uses.29 Although
one or two more might be added to the list of specific types of fair use that
operate in more rule-like fashion,30 the overall number of fair use cases that
provide even a modicum of certainty to the public with regard to future
conduct is miniscule. This uncertainty may lead unwittingly to a
“permission culture,” in which requesting permission is expected,
regardless of whether or not it is necessary, for every use.31
The lack of fair use guidance is especially troubling for the
development of information technology in the United States. The uncertain
prospect of fair use makes it difficult for technology companies and venture
capitalists to make investments, as companies and venture capitalists may
decide against investing in developing new technologies that run the risk of
a copyright lawsuit, notwithstanding the merits of any potential fair use
defense. Further, in some cases, overt threats of a lawsuit by copyright
industries may chill the adoption or marketing of a new technological
function.
Google’s proposed settlement32 of the multimillion dollar class action
criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a caseby-case basis.” (emphasis omitted)).
26. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (calling for case-by-case adjudication of fair use).
27. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
28. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
29. See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
30. For example, quoting a work is commonly recognized as a fair use. There is often much
dispute over how many words can be quoted without permission, however, which may lead to
publishers requiring permission for all quotes of other sources within a book. See Timothy Hill, Entropy
and Atrophy: The Still Uncertain Status of the Fair Use of Unpublished Works and the Implications for
Scholarly Criticism, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 79, 94–96 (2003). Likewise, fair use copying to
make a lexicon is now a recognized type of fair use, but the question of how much copying is
permissible seems less clear ex ante. See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513,
549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that the “amount and substantiality of the portion copied from
the . . . books weighs more heavily against a finding of fair use”).
31. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 192–93 (2004).
32. See Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136-
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copyright lawsuit, filed by the Authors Guild and the Association of
American Publishers against Google Book Search, provides an ominous
warning: even one of the leading and largest tech companies in the world,
with vast resources at its disposal, is unwilling to test the fair use defense
for a new technology that offers much social benefit. The same can be said
for tech giant Amazon, as it agreed to deactivate its “text-to-speech”
function on Kindle for all books unless a copyright holder grants
permission for a particular work on a title-by-title basis.33 If Amazon and
Google, both Fortune 500 companies, stand down from defending fair use
in court, can other tech companies with fewer resources be expected to
stand up and defend a fair use claim?
Although fair use has been analyzed in nearly four hundred law
review articles in the United States,34 figuring out how best to tailor the fair
use factors specifically for technologies has remained elusive.35 In the
1980s, a few articles offered specific proposals on how to tailor fair use for
technologies.36 Unfortunately, the proposals did not appear to have any
influence on subsequent court decisions on fair use. Today, with incredible
advances in information technology along with the Internet, the issue is
very much ripe for review. Two of the most influential copyright scholars,
Paul Goldstein and Pamela Samuelson, have both broached the topic, as
have other scholars.37 Although neither described this category as
DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/r/
view_settlement_agreement [hereinafter Amended GBS Settlement]. The Amended GBS Settlement
was the result of revisions to the original proposed agreement that drew considerable objections from
many entities. See Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, Google and Partners Revise Terms of Digital Book
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009. See also Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.,
No. 05 CV 8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/
r/view_settlement_agreement [hereinafter Original GBS Settlement].
33. Posting of Brad Stone, supra note 19.
34. Goldstein, supra note 8, at 433 (“Fair use is a uniquely American doctrine, and no fewer than
389 articles in American law reviews have squared off with the defense since the doctrine’s first
appearance under that name.”).
35. Of course, scholars have long recognized that copyright law is constantly challenged, if not
driven, by new technologies. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO
THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 29 (rev. ed. 2003).
36. See Adrienne J. Marsh, Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards to Apply,
5 CARDOZO L. REV. 635 (1984); Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as
Well as the Gutenberg Age, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 193 (1980); Note, Toward a Unified Theory of
Copyright Infringement for an Advanced Technological Era, 96 HARV. L. REV. 450 (1982) [hereinafter
Unified Theory].
37. See Goldstein, supra note 8; Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other
Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 49 (1993); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009)
[hereinafter Samuelson, Unbundling]. For other scholarship suggesting changes to fair use or its
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“technological fair use,” both scholars recognized a central premise that
forms the basis for my research here—that is, that a distinctive category of
fair use exists based on the presence of a technology related to the
contemplated fair use.38
This Article explores the theories and contours of technological fair
use. Part II introduces the concept of technological fair use and provides a
brief discussion of the relevant case law involving fair use and
technologies. Part III develops a theory of technological fair use based on
the constitutional values undergirding both the First Amendment and the
Copyright and Patent Clause, as well as economic theory. This part
explains why, as a normative matter, the courts and Congress should afford
breathing room for technological fair use by providing more clearly defined
guidance on what is and is not permissible. Part IV proposes a framework
for technological cases by tailoring the four statutory factors of fair use
specifically for these types of cases. Although my proposed framework
does not yield formulaic certainty to decide all technological fair use cases
(no test of fair use can), it provides guidance for courts and the public on
adjudication in light of technologies, see Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital
Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1410–25 (2004)
(proposing, among other things, the use of a dispute resolution system to handle digital copyright
infringement, with a defense built in for arguable fair use); Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571 (2008) (suggesting applying only the first and fourth fair use factors to new
digital technology cases); and Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the
Digital Age, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1055 (2007) (proposing fair use analysis to “ask how society can
best promote progress in the advancement of knowledge—through its production and access—in a
digital age that brings universal search capability within the reach of everyone with a computer and an
Internet connection”).
38. See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 438–39 (recognizing “the category of cases that tests the
liability of . . . new technologies for the distribution of copyrighted content”); Samuelson, Unbundling,
supra note 37, at 2602 (“One of the important functions of fair use is providing a balancing mechanism
within copyright law to allow it to address questions posed by new technologies or other developments
that the legislature could not or did not contemplate.” (footnote omitted)). Beyond the articles already
cited, only a few others have directly examined aspects of changing or tailoring fair use or comparable
copyright exemption in order to help promote technologies. See Kevin M. Lemley, The Innovative
Medium Defense: A Doctrine to Promote the Multiple Goals of Copyright in the Wake of Advancing
Digital Technologies, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 111 (2005) (advocating that an appropriate balance in
copyright law should be struck to ensure that innovation is not stifled while at the same time allowing
copyright owners to receive sufficient return on their investments); Robin A. Moore, Note, Fair Use
and Innovation Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 944 (2007) (analyzing the economic effect that fair use has
on the incentive to invest and create technologies affecting copyrighted works and suggesting the use of
an “incremental innovation framework” in the copyright context to maximally encourage technological
advances); Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 843 (recognizing the importance of fair use in promoting
technological innovation for “complementary goods to copyrighted works”). While this article was in
the final editing stage of production, Matthew Sag published a thoughtful piece, Matthew Sag,
Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607 (2009), which argues for the
recognition of a principle of nonexpressive use for fair uses related to technologies.
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how these cases should be analyzed. One of the keys to analyzing
technological fair use is to identify the stage of development in which the
alleged fair use is made—the creation, operation, or output of the speech
technology. As a rough guide, more leeway should be allowed for more
extensive uses of copyrighted works at the creation and operation stages of
a technology versus the output stage. This proposed Creation-OperationOutput spectrum informs the analysis of the four factors of fair use. Part V
applies the framework to Google Book Search and the Kindle text-tospeech function and concludes that both involve technological fair uses.
Part VI addresses several concerns arising from this framework of
technological fair use.
II. TOWARD THE EMERGENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE
The Copyright Act codifies the judge-made doctrine of fair use by
stating simply: “[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by
[17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 106A], for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”39 Although
Congress anticipated that new technologies would affect the analysis,40 it
chose to list only four factors to consider when analyzing fair use.41
Technology is nowhere mentioned. Yet technological fair use has become
an emerging, though inchoate, concept in several cases of profound
importance for our information economy.
A. TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE CASES FROM 1984 TO 2010
Although courts have yet to recognize formally technological fair use
as a doctrine, the following cases support the adoption of such a doctrine.
The cases all share a set of common features that distinguish them from
other fair use cases: the fair uses, often involving verbatim copying, were
made for the new or value-adding purpose of creating, operating, and/or
providing output of a speech technology or application.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
40. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
41. These factors are
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107. The last sentence of § 107 clarifies that “[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall not
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.” Id.
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1. Successful Technological Fair Use Cases
To summarize very briefly, courts have recognized fair use related to
the following technological functions, listed in chronological order by case:
(1) in Sony, the time-shift recording of entire television programs on the
VCR at home;42 (2) in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. and its
progeny, the reverse engineering and intermediate copying of entire
software programs to achieve interoperability for an independently written
software program;43 (3) in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc v. Nintendo of America,
Inc., the enhancing or altering of the visual display of copyrighted works
on a video game console (without creating a copy);44 (4) in Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp.,45Field v. Google Inc.,46 and their progeny,47 the copying of the
entirety of millions of photographs and web pages for use in databases to
create and operate Internet search engines, such as for visual searching of
42. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Samuelson
characterizes Sony as involving a technology that facilitates personal uses of copyrighted works. See
Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37, at 2603–05. Although I start with Sony as the first technological
fair use case, several older copyright cases involved technologies. In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, the Court of Claims upheld as fair use the copying of journals by the National Institutes of
Health and the National Library of Medicine for professional use. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
Even before that, the Supreme Court decided a case involving the pianola, a self-playing piano,
although not under fair use. See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 12 (1908),
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2544–45
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). I categorize some of these early technology cases as quasitechnological fair use cases. See infra notes 366–67, 372 and accompanying text. Because most of these
older cases did not involve a decision on fair use, I have not used them in my framework.
43. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). Subsequent cases have
built on this doctrine. See Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37, at 2608–09 & nn.512–13 (listing “the
stream of cases involving reverse engineering” that followed Sega). See also Assessment Techs. of WI,
LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that copyright law did not prevent the
copying of a database in order to obtain the underlying uncopyrighted data stored in the software); Sony
Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603–05 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that reverse
engineering of a video game so it could be played on computers as well as Sony’s console system
constituted fair use); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that
reverse engineering of a computer program to uncover the original source code from the object code
may constitute fair use); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843–44 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (recognizing the use of a reverse engineering process to derive an object code from a computer
chip as fair use).
44. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992). Although
Samuelson categorizes Galoob as a competition or innovation-promoting use in software, see
Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37, at 2605–06 & n.483, I think it would also fit well as a personal
use technology in her taxonomy.
45. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
46. Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
47. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the operator’s display of thumbnail images of the copyright owner’s photographs constituted fair
use).
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images or for storage and display of cached copies of Web pages; and
(5) in A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, the copying of the
entirety of numerous written works for use in a database in order to create
and operate the defendant’s antiplagiarism software.48
2. Unsuccessful Technological Fair Use Cases
In contrast, courts have rejected fair use defenses regarding the
following technological functions: (1) in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., the unauthorized sharing of music files;49 (2) in UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., the copying of music files for use in an online
“space shifting” service through which subscribers could access music
online upon proof they already owned the CD version of the recording;50
(3) in Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh, the copying of movies
in order to create edited, “family friendly” versions that removed or edited
any scenes containing sex, violence, or profanity;51 and (4) in Apple, Inc. v.
Psystar Corp., the mass copying and modification of Apple’s Mac
operating system onto non-Apple, or so-called Open Mac, computers.52
B. CONCEPTUALIZING TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE
One approach to analyzing the above cases would be to consider all of
them separately, each simply presenting its own unique issue of fair use.
This approach would follow the predominant practice of treating fair use on
a case-by-case basis. The better approach, however, is to understand these
cases as raising the same type of fair use claim: technological fair use. The
presence of a speech technology in these cases makes the fair use analysis
48. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
49. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
50. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
51. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006). Congress
enacted an exemption from liability for DVD-skipping technology (for example, Clear Play) that would
allow software to skip over profanity, nudity, violence, and other scenes as long as no copy was created
of the edited playback. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2006) (providing an exemption for “the making
imperceptible . . . of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion picture . . . if no fixed copy
of the altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer program or other technology”).
Because CleanFlicks created and distributed edited copies, however, it did not fall within this
exemption.
52. Apple, Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 931, 935–36 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Some services,
especially on the Internet, might arguably be classified as technologies. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v.
Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting the fair use defense for a service
that created unauthorized movie trailers); L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM
(AJWx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2000) (rejecting the fair use defense for a
bulletin board website that posted news articles for comments by users). This Article does not discuss
all of these cases, but instead focuses on prominent examples to illustrate my theory.
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more complex and more deserving of special treatment.
1. The Need for Case Synthesis
Despite the different technological functions at issue, all of the cases
discussed above share a common set of features: they all involve a
technology that in some way used copyrighted works without the copyright
owner’s permission at some stage in that technology’s development,
whether at its creation, operation, or output stage. In all of the cases, the
legality of the unauthorized use of the copyrighted works decided, for all
intents and purposes, not just the legality of the particular uses of the
copyrighted works, but also the marketability of the technology itself. In the
successful fair use cases above, all of the technologies continued. In the
unsuccessful cases, all of the specific technologies ceased to exist.53 One
exception is the case of music file sharing, as decentralized peer-to-peer
software later evolved to escape the liability faced by Napster.54 These
cases are different from other fair use cases—such as quoting a passage,
borrowing a few musical notes, or displaying a work in the classroom—in
which there is no underlying technology itself at issue.
The starting premise of this Article is that courts should understand all
of these cases as raising a common question over a distinct type of fair use
involving a speech technology. Unfortunately, courts have yet to do so.
This lack of recognition is symptomatic of a larger problem with fair use
jurisprudence generally—that it is notoriously vague and overinsistently ad
hoc. Besides the adoption of “transformative use” or “transformative
purpose” as a relevant factor in examining the first factor of fair use (the
53. Napster and MP3.com had to file for bankruptcy. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig.,
377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“After concluding that it was not technologically feasible to
comply with the court’s . . . order and continue operating its file-sharing network, Napster ceased
operations on July 1, 2001.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, Review Essay, The First Amendment’s Biggest
Threat, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1798, 1833 (2005) (“Within a year, the studios sued MP3.com into
bankruptcy . . . .”). CleanFlicks has changed its business entirely and is now an online subscription
service that offers rentals of family-friendly movies. See Jasen Lee, CleanFlicks Bounces Back, Offers
Online DVD Rentals, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Jan. 10, 2008, at E01. Psystar also saw its business
end, as it was permanently enjoined from selling its Open Mac computers. See Apple Inc. v. Psystar
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
54. Decentralization—meaning here the lack of involvement in the actual use of the software—
afforded a way for software developers to fall within the Sony safe harbor, which protects technologies
with substantial noninfringing uses from secondary liability. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440 (1984). Because peer-to-peer software has substantial noninfringing
uses to disseminate authorized and public domain works, it falls within the Sony safe harbor. However,
the Supreme Court clarified that the Sony safe harbor would not protect developers who actively
induced its users to infringe copyrighted works. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934–37 (2005).
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purpose and character of the use),55 and the Supreme Court’s recognition of
parody as a distinctive form of fair use in 1994,56 courts have tended to
stick very closely to the same—at times, rote—discussion of the four fair
use factors without considering the possibility of the emergence of any new
patterns or types of fair use implicated in a certain case.57 This ad hoc
approach, while sensitive to the facts of each case, gives practically no
guidance to the public on what constitutes permissible fair use.
This approach is not the best way to administer fair use, at least not as
a universal approach for all cases. Applying a case-by-case approach to fair
use has its merits when fine tailoring is needed, but it does not preclude the
possibility of identifying certain specific types of fair use, an endeavor that
Samuelson has recently renewed.58 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s most
extensive discussion of fair use to date, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., recognizes parody as a type of fair use that requires a generalized
tailoring of the fair use factors.59 Although each claimed parody fair use
must be judged on a case-by-case basis,60 the Court tailored each of the
four fair use factors to analyze the special type of parody fair use.61 As
discussed below in Part IV, a similar kind of tailoring should be applied to
technological fair use cases.
55. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The adoption of this
factor was derived from Judge Leval’s insight in his highly influential Harvard Law Review article in
1990. See Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111–
16 (1990).
56. Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 599 F. Supp. 2d
415, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (instructing that courts must examine the four fair use factors and “undertake
a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a given secondary use of a copyrighted work is a fair
use”).
58. See Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37 (arguing that fair use law is more coherent and
predictable than is commonly believed if the fair use cases are seen as falling into common patterns).
See also Alan Latman, Study No. 14, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (Mar. 1958), reprinted in 2
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781 (Copyright Soc’y of Am. ed., Arthur Fisher memorial ed. 1963).
59. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
60. Id. (“[P]arody, like any other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors, and be
judged case by case, in light of the ends of the copyright law.”).
61. Id. at 582 (tailoring the first factor to examine “whether a parodic character may reasonably
be perceived”); id. at 586 (tailoring the second factor to acknowledge that the factor itself, the nature of
the copyrighted work, “is not much help in this case, or ever likely to help much in separating the fair
use sheep from the infringing goats in a parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly
known, expressive works”); id. at 588 (tailoring the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the
copied portion, to acknowledge that parodies must copy some of the copyrighted work in order to “be
able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable”);
id. at 592 (tailoring the fourth factor to not consider “harm to the market” for a copyrighted work
caused by an effective parody of the work).
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Another problem related to the lack of formal recognition of
technological fair use is the lack of coherence in how courts have dealt with
fair use in technology cases. The cases have applied two very different and
inconsistent understandings of the transformative factor in these types of
cases. When a fair use is found, courts have typically applied a broader
understanding of the term “transformative” to include the use of exact
copies of the entire copyrighted work for a new purpose.62 Thus, a
transformative purpose in copying a work for a new technology—such as a
search engine or antiplagiarism technology—can weigh in favor of fair use,
notwithstanding the fact that the copy is an exact copy of the original.
However, in rejecting fair use claims in technological cases, other courts
have applied a very narrow understanding of “transformative” to examine
only whether some new content has been added to the copyrighted work
itself.63 Under this approach, a new purpose in using exactly the same work
as the original for a new technology is not transformative at all. These two
conflicting standards of “transformative” cannot be reconciled and have
created unnecessary confusion in the case law.
2. The Basic Definition of Technological Fair Use
To clear up this doctrinal confusion and provide better guidance to the
public, courts should recognize a distinct category of technological fair use.
By “technological fair use,” I mean to describe a category of fair use—like
parody fair use—that recurs with certain characteristics in different cases.
In the case of parody fair use, the cases are defined by the person’s use of a
copyrighted work to parody it. In the case of technological fair use, the use
is for a new or value-adding purpose of creating, operating, or providing
62. See, e.g., A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009)
(finding that the use of the plaintiff’s works in the antiplagiarism detection system was transformative
because it had an entirely different function and purpose than the original works, and that the fact that
there was no alteration to the works did not preclude finding that use to be transformative); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721–23 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that Google’s use of images
for its visual search index was highly transformative because the use served a different function than the
original images served); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–20 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the
use of the copyright owner’s images for online visual searches transformative because it served a
different function than the owner’s use); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1111 (D. Nev.
2006) (finding that because the Google search engine’s use of cached snapshots of websites pages
served a different purpose from that of the original works, use of these copyrighted works was
transformative).
63. See, e.g., Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1241 (D. Colo.
2006) (finding that the family-friendly, edited versions of movies added nothing new to the original and
were therefore not transformative under the first factor of fair use); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com,
Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no transformative use because the space shifting
added nothing new to the original songs, instead “simply repackag[ing] those recordings to facilitate
their transmission through another medium”).
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an output of a technology or application.
Yet this is not to say that all new uses of copyrighted works to create
or operate a technology are fair uses. Some should not be. Just as some
asserted parody fair uses may go too far and fall outside the exemption, so
too some asserted technological fair uses may fail to qualify for the
exemption. Later in this Article, I outline a framework to help separate fair
versus unfair technological uses. For now, it is important to understand
what kind of cases fall under the rubric of technological fair use. This part
has identified the common factual features that distinguish technological
fair use cases. The next part identifies the normative bases that further
distinguish this category of fair use.
III. THE THEORY UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE
Unfortunately, the relationship between technologies and fair use
remains undertheorized. Only a few articles have entertained a possible
connection between the two.64 To the extent that a theory has been offered
to justify this connection, it has focused narrowly on economic reasons.65
While important, economic theories of fair use are inadequate to provide
the entire, or even primary, normative basis for fair use. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, the fair use doctrine is a First Amendment safeguard
for speech activities.66 By promoting the development of speech
technologies that enable greater speech activities, technological fair use can
serve “double duty” in this important role as a First Amendment safeguard
by serving the freedoms of both the speech and the press. The doctrine also
serves both goals of the Copyright and Patent Clause, to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts. This four-goal underpinning—
serving the values of free speech, free press, science, and useful arts—
64. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
65. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 38, at 1639–57 (proposing a theory of nonexpressive use of works
under fair use based on an economic analysis of transaction costs); Moore, supra note 38, at 959–65
(arguing that traditional fair use analysis does not fully take into account economic incentives to authors
and technology companies); Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 840–43 (examining copying technologies
that have developed complementary economic relationships with the copyrighted works). Sigmund
Timberg’s work is a notable exception that discusses the importance of the Copyright Clause and the
First Amendment in understanding how fair use should be applied for technologies. See Timberg, supra
note 36, at 229 (“The question remains why the first amendment and the copyright clause, two
constitutional provisions that both stress the dissemination of information and ideas to the public, and
access by the public to information and ideas, should be following their separate legal tracks, with the
courts never taking cognizance of the fact that the two provisions are following parallel routes to similar
destinations.”).
66. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (explaining that fair use “allows the
public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself”).
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distinguishes technological fair use cases from other fair use cases, which
typically involve only two constitutional goals, the freedom of speech and
the progress of science. This part elaborates these theories underlying
technological fair use.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS
Technological fair use serves four different, but related, goals of the
Free Speech, Free Press, and Copyright and Patent Clauses.67 Each of these
clauses provides a constitutional underpinning for technological fair use.
By “constitutional underpinning,” I mean a foundation from the
Constitution on which a doctrine rests. The doctrine itself does not
necessarily have to be constitutionally required, although it may be.
Sometimes, the Court does not resolve whether it is required, yet the
doctrine nonetheless operates prophylactically or as a safeguard within an
area of law.68 The doctrine, particularly if codified by statute, may also be a
way for a court to avoid results that would raise constitutional doubt, while
avoiding a ruling of constitutional nature.69 This section discusses the
constitutional underpinnings for technological fair use, while leaving
undecided the larger question of whether fair use is constitutionally
required, just as the Supreme Court has done.70
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press . . . .”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). The Supreme Court has typically viewed the freedom of
speech and the freedom of the press as two clauses, albeit related. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 839 (1994) (using the terminology, “when applying the Free Speech and Press Clauses”). By
contrast, the Court has referred to Congress’s copyright and patent power in Article I as one clause but
at times has also referred to it as two clauses. Compare Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192 (referring to “[t]he
Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution”), with Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (referring to “the Patent and Copyright Clauses of the Constitution”).
However sliced, the clauses dealing with free speech, free press, the copyright power, and the patent
power pertain to at least four distinct areas or purposes, as I discuss in Part III.A below. As long as we
recognize these four distinct purposes, I do not think it matters if one characterizes free speech/free
press or copyright/patent powers as one or two clauses. The Constitution is not mathematics.
68. See Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of
Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1999) (discussing prophylactic rules in Supreme Court
jurisprudence).
69. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (discussing the canon of construction of avoiding constitutional doubt as applied
to the interpretation of congressional statutes).
70. The Supreme Court has indicated its view that fair use is a central feature “necessary” for our
copyright system: “From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of
copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575
(1994) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). In Eldred, the Court also stated

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

8/9/2010 9:41:24 AM

TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE

813

1. Technological Fair Use and the First Amendment
Fair use is a judge-made doctrine that dates back to the very “infancy
of copyright protection”71 and establishes one of the “traditional contours”
of our copyright system.72 The Supreme Court has recognized that the fair
use doctrine operates as an internal “First Amendment safeguard[]” within
copyright law that works prophylactically to keep copyright law from
infringing First Amendment rights.73 It does so by providing breathing
room for speech activities involving copyrighted works, even though the
activities have not been authorized by the copyright holders. More
typically, these speech activities promote the freedom of speech, such as
through commentary and criticism of copyrighted works. But in the case of
technological fair use, it serves not only the freedom of speech, but also the
freedom of the press—meaning the development of speech technologies.
a. Freedom of the Press and Protecting Speech Technologies
First, the Free Press Clause: although long overlooked in legal
scholarship, this Clause provides a central underpinning for technological
fair use. As I have recounted in prior scholarship, the Framers intended the
Free Press Clause to act as a direct limit on Congress’s ability to regulate
speech technologies under the Copyright Clause.74 To the framing
generation, the freedom of the press meant originally the “freedom of the
printing press.”75 One of the chief evils in sixteenth-century England that
that First Amendment scrutiny would be required if Congress changed a traditional contour of
copyright, such as the fair use doctrine. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. For scholarship making the claim that
fair use is constitutionally required, see Jonathan Band, Google and Fair Use, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 6
(2008) (arguing that “fair use is a constitutionally required structural element that harmonizes the
copyright law with the First Amendment”); Stanley F. Birch, Brace Memorial Lecture, Copyright Fair
Use: A Constitutional Imperative, 54 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 141, 165 (2007) (characterizing
“fair use” as having “constitutional dimensions”); Stephen M. McJohn, Eldred’s Aftermath: Tradition,
the Copyright Clause, and the Constitutionalization of Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 95, 128–33 (2003) (arguing that after Eldred, fair use has attained constitutional status).
71. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575.
72. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
73. See id. at 219–20. See also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
560 (1985) (discussing First Amendment protections embodied in the Copyright Act).
74. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 318–51. See also Edward Lee, Guns and
Speech Technologies: How the Right to Bear Arms Affects Copyright Regulations of Speech
Technologies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1037, 1045–64 (2009) [hereinafter Lee, Guns and Speech
Technologies] (discussing the significance of the fact that the Free Press Clause and Second
Amendment are the only constitutional provisions that expressly protect individual rights to a
technology). For simplicity, I will not cite here again all of the documentary sources contemporaneous
with the Framing that support my theory. These sources are cited and at times quoted at length in my
prior scholarship.
75. Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies, supra note 74, at 1047 (emphasis added).
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the Framers wished to combat was the imposition of severe limits on the
technology of the printing press, such as its ownership and the total number
of presses allowed in England.76 By controlling the technology of the press,
the Crown (and later Parliament) sought to control both heresy77 and
piracy78 of copyrighted works, with the latter goal intended to serve the
interests of the Stationers’ Company, the de facto copyright holders of the
period.79 That repressive regime in England—codified by the various
Printing Acts—lasted over a century, but was eventually dismantled with a
movement among the populace for a freedom of the press and the
enactment in 1710 of a less restrictive alternative in the Statute of Anne,
England’s first copyright act.80 Notably, the Statute of Anne did not
replicate any of the repressive technology limits contained in the prior
Printing Acts.81 The change was monumental. As Blackstone wrote, once
the restrictions under the Printing Acts ended, “the press became properly
free . . . and has ever since so continued.”82
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution were informed by this history
and sought to avoid the same problems of press controls that had occurred
in England. The Copyright Clause and first Copyright Act were modeled in
part on the Statute of Anne.83 But the Framers did Parliament one better—
by codifying the freedom of the press in the Bill of Rights.84
This codification of the freedom of the press in the Bill of Rights was
intended to remove any doubt that Congress had no authority whatsoever to
use the Copyright Clause—or, for that matter, any other clause—to restrict
the technology of the press. During the ratification debates, the Anti76. See id. at 1061–62; Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 329.
77. See Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies, supra note 74, at 1061.
78. See id. at 1061–62.
79. See id.
80. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 327–28; Lee, Guns and Speech
Technologies, supra note 74, at 1062–63.
81. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 327–28; Lee, Guns and Speech
Technologies, supra note 74, at 1062.
82. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152.
83. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 349–52 (1998) (discussing
the role the Statute of Anne played in the development of U.S. copyright law). See also Fred Fisher
Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647–50 (1943) (same), superseded by statute,
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573–76 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 304 (2006)).
84. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 332–39 (discussing the debate between
the Federalists and Anti-Federalists over the clause); Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies, supra note
74, at 1063–64 (same); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Essay, Copyright in 1791: An Essay
Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 942–43 (2003).
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Federalists successfully argued that the Free Press Clause was needed
specifically to limit the government’s potential power under the Copyright
Clause to restrict the press in service of copyright holders.85 As James
Madison, a Federalist and the drafter of the first proposal for the Free Press
Clause, recognized, “[T]he article of amendment, instead of supposing in
Congress a power that might be exercised over the press, provided its
freedom was not abridged, was meant as a positive denial to Congress of
any power whatever on the subject.”86
Thus, the Free Press Clause is a protection for speech technologies,
especially against restrictions effectuated through copyright law in service
of copyright holders. Although the Supreme Court has yet to tease out this
important history of the Free Press Clause and its connection to copyright
law,87 in the Court’s defense, thus far it has not had many cases in which it
has had the opportunity to do so. For more than two hundred years of our
nation’s history, dating back to the first Copyright Act in 1790, our
copyright law has avoided imposing any direct restriction on speech
technologies.88 A traditional contour of our copyright law has been to keep
copyright law from regulating speech technologies.
Although this tradition is increasingly being tested today by copyright
holders’ efforts to use copyright law to restrict technologies, the Supreme
Court has offered one doctrinal solution—the Sony safe harbor—that
85. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 331–39; Lee, Guns and Speech
Technologies, supra note 74, at 1063–64.
86. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 141, 143 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis added). Before the
Bill of Rights’ adoption, the Federalists tried to maintain that a free press clause was unnecessary
because Congress had no power to restrict the press under the original Constitution. For example, James
Iredell, a leading Federalist and later an original Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, stated, “If the
Congress should exercise any other power over the press than this [grant of copyrights for a limited
time], they will do it without any warrant from this constitution, and must answer for it as for any other
act of tyranny.” James Iredell, Observations on George Mason’s Objections to the Federal Constitution
(1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING
ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 1787–1788, at 333, 361 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888). Yet this
standard Federalist argument did not assuage the Anti-Federalists’ and people’s desire for an expressly
written out free press clause limiting Congress’s power to restrict the press.
87. The Court has briefly discussed the intersection between the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment and the Copyright Clause. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“The First
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s own speech; it bears
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches.”); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to
be the engine of free expression.”).
88. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 352 (“From 1790 to 1992 every U.S.
copyright law enacted stayed clear of direct regulation of the machines that enabled mass copying and
publication.” (footnote omitted)).
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provides some breathing room for the development of speech
technologies.89 Under the Sony safe harbor, a developer of a technology
cannot be held secondarily liable for the infringement committed by users
of the technology if the technology is capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.90 Elsewhere, I have attempted to show how the Sony safe harbor
operates as a traditional First Amendment safeguard in copyright law,
much like fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy.91 By providing a
safe harbor for the development of speech technologies free from copyright
lawsuits, the Sony safe harbor serves the important free press goal of
protecting speech technologies from intrusive governmental restrictions.92
The doctrine of technological fair use does the same, but at the level
of direct copyright liability. Whereas the Sony safe harbor protects speech
technologies from secondary liability claims, technological fair use does so
against direct liability claims.
For example, in Sony, the Court’s finding of fair use based on timeshift recordings went to the issue of direct liability of users of VCRs.93 That
finding was also relevant to the Court’s application of the Sony safe harbor
in the secondary liability claim against Sony because the fair use recordings
demonstrated that the VCR was capable of a substantial noninfringing
use.94 Both rulings in Sony—the fair use decision on time-shifting by
consumers and the application of the Sony safe harbor to the VCR—help to
provide breathing room for the development of speech technologies,
consistent with the Free Press Clause. In this respect, technological fair use
cases are special. In fair use cases without technologies, this free press
interest is simply absent.
b. Free Speech Activities
The more commonly recognized connection between fair use and the
First Amendment is the protection that fair use provides within the
copyright system for the freedom of speech.95 This free speech rationale
applies generally to all kinds of fair use, not just technological fair uses.
89. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
90. Id. The Court has subsequently held that the safe harbor does not apply where a developer
actively induced others to engage in infringement. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935–37 (2005) (discussing active inducement liability).
91. See Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 369–79.
92. See id. at 373–79.
93. Sony, 464 U.S. at 447–56.
94. Id.
95. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (characterizing fair use as a “free speech
safeguard[]”).
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The basic idea is that fair use provides some breathing room for speechrelated activities.96 As the Court has explained, “The fair use
doctrine . . . ‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity
which that law is designed to foster.’”97
Fair use is needed as a First Amendment safeguard within copyright
law, even though copyrights are generally viewed by the Supreme Court as
speech promoting or, in the oft-quoted phrase, “the engine of free
expression.”98 As the Court noted, “By establishing a marketable right to
the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to
create and disseminate ideas.”99 But this incentive rationale of copyright is
not enough to keep it from raising First Amendment problems. To borrow
the Court’s metaphor, sometimes the engine of free expression breaks
down or needs a coolant or lubrication. Fair use is one of the internal First
Amendment safeguards meant to keep the so-called engine of free
expression on track and running smoothly. Thus, in one well-recognized
example of fair use, people can quote passages of copyrighted works
without authorization in order to critique or review it.100
Technological fair uses promote speech activities in somewhat
different ways than other fair uses, such as quotations. Technological fair
uses have the potential to provide additional engines of free expression. In
this sense, they can promote potentially greater First Amendment interests
(at least in terms of the number of people affected) than the run-of-the-mill
fair use case, given the possibility that the new speech technology in
question can affect an exponential number of speech activities among the
millions of people using that technology. Instead of just one fair use,
technological fair use can facilitate many. For example, at the height of its
popularity, the VCR was owned by close to 90 percent of all U.S.
households.101 Likewise, today, Google’s search engine is used by
hundreds of millions of people, with over nine billion search requests per
96. Some scholars doubt whether, in practice, fair use adequately serves this interest. See, e.g.,
Lee Ann W. Lockridge, The Myth of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine as a Protector of Free Speech, 24
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay:
How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
97. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
98. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
99. Id.
100. Section 107 recognizes fair uses for the purposes of “criticism, comment, . . . [and]
scholarship.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
101. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

DO NOT DELETE

818

8/9/2010 9:41:24 AM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:797

month made in the United States alone.102 And the speech activity that is
facilitated by the speech technology may be an entirely new kind of speech
activity than before. For example, before the VCR, people did not record
shows at home.
The timing of the speech activity may also differ in technological fair
use cases. In the run-of-the-mill fair use case, such as quoting copyrighted
expression to critique it, fair use is often tied directly to the creation or
dissemination of more speech. However, in technological fair uses, that is
not necessarily the case. Instead, technological fair use is often tied directly
to the creation of a speech technology, but the timing of the creation or
dissemination of speech varies. Sometimes, it is close in time, as in the
Sega case, which involved Accolade’s creation of a new game soon after its
fair use of Sega’s programming code to find the specifications necessary to
make the game interoperable on Sega consoles.103 Other times, the timing
is more delayed. For example, fair use of copyrighted works to create
antiplagiarism software directly produces a new speech technology, which
in turn indirectly creates more long-term incentives for students to create
their own speech—without plagiarizing other students’ works.104 Likewise,
fair use of copyrighted works to create a more advanced Internet search
engine directly yields a new technology105 and may lead to better research
that may eventually play a part in the creation of new expression. Finally,
in some cases, no new work is created from the fair use, such as in Sony,
where the recordings of television shows led primarily to the greater
dissemination of the same copyrighted works subject to fair use.106
2. Technological Fair Use and the Copyright and Patent Clause
The Copyright and Patent Clause provides another constitutional
underpinning for technological fair use in addition to the First Amendment.
a. Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of fair use
generally in serving the ends of the Copyright and Patent Clause: “From
the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of
102. Trouble in the Google-Verse: Users Report Problems Using Google Search Engine, Gmail,
Other Features, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 14, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/tech_guide/2009/05/
14/2009-05-14_trouble_in_the_googleverse_users_report_problems_using_google_search_engine_
gmai.html.
103. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1515–16 (9th Cir. 1992).
104. See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 638 (4th Cir. 2009).
105. See Perfect 10, Inc., v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 711–12, 721–23 (9th Cir. 2007).
106. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984).
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copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very
purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’”107
The Supreme Court, however, has shied away from fully defining what
constitutes “the Progress of Science” or “useful Arts.” Intellectual property
historians have contended that, at the time of the Framing, “the Progress of
Science” meant learning or knowledge (referring to the goal of
copyright),108 while “useful Arts” meant technology or innovation (the goal
of the patent system).109 The Court has made clear that “[t]he economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”110
Because of this overriding public interest rationale of the Copyright
and Patent Clause, our copyright and patent laws are not intended to serve
primarily the individual copyright or patent holder, but instead the public at
large.111 To help achieve this end, courts have developed various doctrines
to accommodate the public interest.112
107. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (alteration in original)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
108. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing E.
WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 125–26 (2002)) (arguing that the Copyright Clause is to promote “the progress of
‘Science’—by which word the Framers meant learning or knowledge”). See also Cary v. Kearsley,
(1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B.) (“[W]hile I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the
enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science.”).
109. See Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies, supra note 74, at 1046; Karl B. Lutz, Patents and
Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54
(1949).
110. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2541–44 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
111. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002)
(“The patent laws ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ by rewarding innovation with a
temporary monopoly.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of
authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8)); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“Creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.” (footnote omitted)); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring
the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (“[T]he primary purpose of
our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is ‘to promote the
progress of science and useful arts’ . . . .” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
112. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 349–50 (“To this end, copyright assures authors the right
to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
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Fair use is one such doctrine. Fair use promotes knowledge and
learning, as § 107 specifically recognizes “criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, [and] research”113 as exemplary
purposes of fair use. These types of fair use directly relate to learning or the
cultivation of knowledge. A person attempting to make fair use of a
copyrighted work for one of these recognized purposes, such as criticism of
or commentary on a published work, is more than likely learning
something and possibly adding to the sum of our knowledge.
Technological fair use is different from—and, in some respects, has a
greater impact than—other fair uses. In short, technological fair use can
serve the goals of promoting both the progress of science and the useful
arts—which does not usually happen in nontechnological fair uses. First,
technological fair uses typically result in the immediate public benefit of
the created speech technology—for example, the VCR,114 Internet search
engines,115 and antiplagiarism software116—which promotes innovation or
the useful arts, an aim more commonly attributed to the patent system.
And, if the technology developed is not patented or protected as a trade
secret, then the public at large can benefit immediately from the know-how
possibly entering the public domain without the twenty-year monopoly
period that is secured by a patent.117 An additional public benefit is derived
from use of the technology (for example, a search engine to find
information), which can promote the more typical benefits of fair use such
as learning and knowledge—but often on an exponential scale among
millions of users that cannot be matched by a nontechnological fair use.
b. Avoiding Back-Door Patents Through Copyright over Functional
Elements
Another reason for recognizing technological fair use is that it can
serve as an important buffer between the copyright and patent systems. As
the seminal case of Baker v. Selden118 teaches, copyright holders should not
be allowed to attain patent-like control over functional elements through
conveyed by a work.” (citation omitted)).
113. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
114. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
115. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
116. See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
117. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). See also Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63–64
(1998) (discussing how the patent system grants exclusive monopolies for a limited period of time).
118. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880), superseded by statute, Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, sec. 703, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)).
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their copyrights.119 In Baker, the Court held that certain accounting forms
could not be copyrighted because they instantiated the useful method of
accounting that the copyright holder failed to patent; rather, “[t]he claim to
an invention or discovery of an art or manufacture must be subjected to the
examination of the Patent Office before an exclusive right therein can be
obtained; and it can only be secured by a patent from the government.”120
This teaching of Baker is codified today in § 102(b) of the Copyright
Act.121 Although copyright law today allows copyrights over expressive
works with functional elements (such as computer programs; pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; and architectural works), various doctrines
have developed, in addition to § 102(b), to avoid turning a copyright into a
de facto patent.122 Likewise, the Sony safe harbor can be understood as a
way to prevent copyright holders from attaining a patent-like right to
dictate the design of a functional technology.123 The Sony Court viewed the
copyright holders’ claims against Sony as the functional equivalent of
asserting “the exclusive right to distribute VTR’s”—which, although the
Court stopped short of characterizing it this way, is arguably tantamount to
one of the exclusive rights under a patent.124 In addition to this safe harbor,
the copyright misuse doctrine protects against similar concerns.125
119. Id. at 102–04.
120. Id. See also Lemley, supra note 38, at 134 (“Apparently, the Framers had a sort of one-two
punch in mind: patent owners create new mediums, while copyright owners create new content to
disseminate through those mediums.”). For an excellent account of this teaching of Baker, see Pamela
Samuelson, The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and
Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES, supra note 6, at 159.
121. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). In at least one technological fair use case, the anti-“back-door”
patent rationale was expressly recognized. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
1526 (9th Cir. 1992) (“If disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair use, the owner of
the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the functional aspects of his work—aspects that were
expressly denied copyright protection by Congress.” (citation omitted)).
122. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that
copyright protection for software does not extend to methods that are performed with program
guidance); Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 920–21 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating
that copyright protection is given when there is separability between the utilitarian and artistic aspects
of a work).
123. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441 n.21 (1984) (“It
seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon all copyright owners collectively,
much less the two respondents in this case, the exclusive right to distribute VTR’s simply because they
may be used to infringe copyrights.”). See also Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 379
(“Copyright law does not protect useful systems—that is the province of patents.”).
124. Sony, 464 U.S. at 441 n.21. See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
125. Under the misuse doctrine, a copyright or patent holder who “misuses” copyright or patent is
barred from suing for infringement. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir.
1990) (“But the public policy which includes [original works] within the granted monopoly excludes
from it all that is not embraced in the [original expression]. It equally forbids the use of the [copyright]
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Likewise, technological fair use provides an additional buffer between
copyright and patent law. It avoids giving copyright holders the ability to
control new speech technologies or prevent their development (the socalled veto power) when the copyright holders have not yet patented the
technology in question. This buffer is necessary because innovation of
speech technologies should not be left to the wishes of copyright industries.
In sum, technological fair use cases typically serve four constitutional
values (press, speech, science, and useful arts), whereas other fair use cases
typically involve only two (speech and science). Because technological fair
use cases do, in effect, double constitutional duty compared to other fair
use cases, courts should recognize technological fair use as a discrete
category for more specialized treatment.
B. ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE
Technological fair use can also be justified on economic grounds as a
way to provide breathing room for developers who wish to innovate in
developing new speech technologies—technologies that play an increasing
part in the growth of the U.S. economy.
1. Breathing Room to Develop Speech Technologies and More “Engines
of Free Expression”
Recognizing technological fair use as a doctrine can help provide
greater incentives for developers to develop and investors to invest in
speech technologies. As the Supreme Court explained in the context of
discussing the Sony safe harbor, copyright law should provide “breathing
room for innovation and a vigorous commerce.”126 The Sony safe harbor
does so by providing developers a safe harbor from secondary liability for
developing a technology that is capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.127 Although a technological fair use doctrine would not have the same
level of categorical certainty as a safe harbor, it could provide more
guidance to developers on what constitutes fair use than the current ad hoc
approach.
Greater clarity is preferable for our copyright system. As the Court
recognized in the patent context, “[C]larity is essential to promote progress,
to secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the [Copyright] Office and which it is
contrary to public policy to grant.” (alterations in original) (quoting Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger,
314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942))). See also Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 901, 924–41 (2004) (discussing the possible theories underlying the copyright misuse doctrine).
126. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005).
127. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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because it enables efficient investment in innovation,”128 a view shared by
the law-and-economics school.129 Chief Justice Rehnquist summed it up
best: “Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the
general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important
that the boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as
possible.”130
Breathing room is important for the development of technologies
because new technologies are inherently difficult, if not impossible, to
predict. As Clayton Christensen has explained in his pathbreaking study on
disruptive technologies, “[N]either manufacturers nor customers know how
or why the products will be used, and hence do not know what specific
features of the product will and will not ultimately be valued.”131 Or, more
succinctly, “Markets that don’t exist can’t be analyzed.”132 L. Gordon
Crovitz’s chronicle of the Top 10 Worst Technology Predictions of all time
illuminates how even the brightest minds routinely blunder in predicting
new technologies and their social value.133
Faced with this inherent unpredictability, policymakers should favor a
decentralized approach, allowing breathing room for many different types
128. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730–31 (2002). Cf.
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 613 (1992) (arguing
that “postponing the establishment of precedents that will guide future activity . . . involves a high cost,
as behavior in the interim will not benefit from the guidance of whatever precedent might later be set”);
Antonin Scalia, Essay, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989)
(noting an “obvious advantage of establishing . . . a clear, general principle of decision: predictability”).
In the abstract, uncertainty in the law can produce over- and underdeterrence. See Ben Depoorter,
Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1836–37
(2009). For example, in some contexts, uncertainty over fair use may “chill” speech by causing people
who would pursue legitimate fair uses to be scared off by the possibility of being sued by copyright
holders. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1543–
44 (2008) [hereinafter Lee, Warming Up]. Yet, in other contexts, uncertainty may help bring about
“warming” of speech by emboldening people to engage in activities (some legitimate, others not) that
other people are engaging in. Id. at 1544. But because speech technologies are typically commercial and
therefore more likely to draw scrutiny from copyright holders, one would expect that legal uncertainty
may have a greater overdeterrence effect if copyright holders can easily threaten a lawsuit to stop
certain technologies.
129. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 93, 97 (4th ed. 2004)
(arguing that “defining simple and clear property rights” lowers transaction costs and in turn,
“lubricates” bargaining).
130. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
131. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA 150–51 (rev. ed. 2003); id. at 178
(“It is simply impossible to predict with any useful degree of precision how disruptive products will be
used or how large their markets will be.”).
132. Id. at xxv.
133. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Information Age: Technology Predictions Are Mostly Bunk, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 28, 2009, at A15.
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of technologies to develop.134 Because we are unlikely to be able to predict
the value, utility, or costs of a new speech technology to society, we should
allow developers the leeway—or freedom to innovate—to try out many
different possibilities in the marketplace. Moreover, this leeway should not
simply vanish once the speech technology is launched and a copyright
holder sues. As Tim Wu has explained, one of the biggest dangers of broad
intellectual property rights is their capability of centralizing a hierarchical
power over products to intellectual property holders.135 When given a
choice between hierarchical and decentralized decisionmaking, “[i]n
general, the economic literature strongly favors decentralized decision
structures in economic systems, based on the observation that free-market
economies perform better than planned, centralized economies.”136 That is
particularly true in the context of great change or uncertainty.137 Fair use is
thus better understood as a way to promote “decentralized decisionmaking
in product development.”138
Breathing room is also necessary because disruptive technologies are
least likely to come from established firms. Christensen identified a key
problem in how innovation is confined among established or incumbent
firms: the “innovator’s dilemma” is that established companies and
industries are actually limited by their own value network (which may, in
fact, have brought them past financial success), with the effect being that
they can be hamstrung in their ability to innovate in new or emerging
markets.139
The innovator’s dilemma suggests that startup technology companies
may be an important source of innovation—indeed, Amazon, Google,
eBay, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter were all just startups when they
first launched their revolutionary Internet platforms and applications.
Although some well-established tech companies like Apple and Google
continue to innovate in entirely new areas compared with their previous
business, startups have played a critical role in innovation in the
134. See Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 281 (2004)
(“[N]either government nor industry monopolists are well situated to choose what technologies or firms
the nation should use to communicate, now or in the future.”).
135. See Tim Wu, Essay, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA.
L. REV. 123, 126 (2006).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 130–31.
138. Id. at 127.
139. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 131, at 61–63. See also id. at xxvi (“Companies whose
investment processes demand quantification of market sizes and financial returns before they can enter
a market get paralyzed or make serious mistakes when faced with disruptive technologies.”).
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information technology and Internet sectors. Yet, despite the critical role
startups play in innovation, they are probably the least likely to be able to
withstand or litigate a major copyright lawsuit.140 They also may be unable
to secure funding to keep afloat if investors view the technology as
susceptible to a copyright lawsuit, irrespective of the actual merits of the
copyright claim.141 This is especially true if copyright holders persist in
aggressive attempts to expand copyright law to include “tertiary liability”
against investors themselves.142
The major copyright industries (such as publishing, music, and
movies) appear particularly vulnerable to this shortcoming in handling
innovation. Most, if not all, of these industries are not themselves typically
in the business of developing new technologies. The business models of
these industries have remained fairly unchanged for many years—the basic
model is to sell and distribute books, music, and movies to the public after
choosing or financing the works. Although the music and movie industries
have had a few major changes in format of distribution (books less so until
recently), those changes were driven by technologies first developed by
others.143 As established firms with entrenched value networks whose main
goal is to sell content, the major copyright industries are poorly positioned
to evaluate or foster innovation in speech technologies.144
140. For example, both Napster and MP3.com went bankrupt after being sued. See supra note 53
and accompanying text.
141. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 37, at 1388 (“Over and above the direct restrictions on
innovation, the threat of lawsuits or criminal prosecutions against innovators is likely to deter a
significant amount of innovation, some of which would unquestionably have been legal.” (footnote
omitted)).
142. See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Cal. 2005). See
generally Benjamin H. Glatstein, Comment, Tertiary Copyright Liability, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1605,
1605 (2004) (examining the viability of tertiary copyright liability, explaining that “[t]ertiary liability
reaches parties that assist a second party, but maintain no relationship with the primary party,” and
describing tertiary copyright liability as “an action against those who help the helper”); Jessica Litman,
Brace Memorial Lecture, War and Peace, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 13 (Fall 2005–Winter
2006) (mentioning a lawsuit against an investor that “sent precisely the chill it was intended to into
Silicon Valley”).
143. See PATRY, supra note 5, at 40–41 (mentioning online production and distribution of music
and movies).
144. The Hollywood video distribution site Hulu might be a notable exception. A joint venture
between NBC Universal and Fox, Hulu was developed in response to the disruptive technology of
YouTube. See generally Chuck Salter, The Unlikely Mogul, FAST COMPANY, Nov. 2009, at 98 (tracing
the development and popularity of Hulu). In fact, Hulu was dubbed the “YouTube killer.” See, e.g.,
Jessi Hempel, How Hulu Became the Season’s Hit, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2008, at 44. Hulu’s elegantly
designed video player and exceptional video resolution have created stiff competition for YouTube in
terms of both advertisers and viewers. See Edward Lee, Remixing Lessig, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 41, 62–63 (2010). Nevertheless, YouTube, not Hulu, first led the innovation in online video. See
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Because of the limitations of their own existing value networks, the
major copyright industries may have a proclivity to view new technologies
as constant threats to their business and established business plans,
especially if the technology enables any copying of content.145 This antinew-technology skepticism of copyright holders dates back to the earliest
days of copyright, from the development of the printing press to the
phonograph.146 Under this anti-new-technology skepticism or bias,
copyright holders view every new speech technology as a potential threat to
their existing business model, and thus they try to stop, control, or leverage
the new technology.147 In his latest book, copyright expert William Patry
chronicles the many instances in which the major copyright industries have
taken positions against new technologies.148
Part of the problem is that copyright holders may greatly undervalue
the social benefits that a new technology offers. As Mark Lemley and R.
Anthony Reese explain, “Economic evidence strongly suggests that those
unanticipated future benefits, or ‘spillover’ effects, often exceed the
immediate value of most new technologies.”149 Sometimes, the new
technologies foster the development of consumer activities or new markets
that complement or add even more value to the copyright holders’
market.150
One (in)famous example can be found in Hollywood’s unsuccessful
attempt to ban the VCR—which eventually brought the movie studios their
biggest source of revenue.151 Similarly, contrary to Hollywood studios’
fears, the DVR has helped, not hurt, Hollywood. As a result of DVR use,
the total viewing of network television shows and the commercials that air
during these shows has actually increased.152 As more DVRs sell, more
Salter, supra, at 103.
145. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 38, at 135–36 (explaining that copyright owners have no
incentive to innovate with new media because they would “require[] the introduction of unproven
business models and unknown modes of copyright enforcement”); Wu, supra note 134, at 292–95
(describing the conflict between new and existing disseminators of copyrighted content).
146. See PATRY, supra note 5, at xxii (recounting how the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers “put out a pamphlet decrying the phonograph record as ‘the murderer of
music’”); Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 320–23 (describing early English regulation
of the printing press).
147. See PATRY, supra note 5, at 20–30.
148. See id.
149. Lemley & Reese, supra note 37, at 1387 (footnote omitted).
150. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 840–43.
151. See id. at 851–52.
152. See Bill Carter, TV Finds That Mortal Foe, DVR, Is Friend After All, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2009, at B1 (“According to Nielsen, 46 percent of viewers 18 to 49 years old for all four networks taken
together are watching the commercials during playback . . . .”).
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people are now able to watch television shows,153 and contrary to industry
fears, a high percentage of those viewers still sit though the
commercials.154 Likewise, YouTube—still embroiled in copyright lawsuits
for unauthorized posting of content by YouTube users—has been used
increasingly by Hollywood studios that have chosen to monetize such
unauthorized postings through YouTube’s video identification program
instead of asking for their removal.155
This discussion is not meant in any way as a rebuke of the major
copyright industries. They are important to the U.S. economy in their own
right156 and have played an important part in the distribution of many
amazing works over the years. We should not expect them to be developers
of speech technologies. That is not their typical business.157 But precisely
because it is not their business, we should be wary of allowing them to
dictate or limit the ways in which new speech technologies are developed.
The copyright industry is supposed to maximize the profits of their
shareholders, not the overall welfare of the public.
The copyright system is intended to maximize overall public welfare,
however—that is, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”158 If, as the Supreme Court has already recognized, copyright law
must afford “breathing room” to developers of speech technologies,159 the
breathing room must give plenty of legal space for developers to develop
those technologies without the threat of a lawsuit from copyright holders.
And if the fair use doctrine currently lacks the kind of ex ante clarity
needed for technological innovation,160 then courts should refine the
doctrine accordingly.
153. This increased viewing occurs especially within three days of the original air date—the
period measured by Nielsen ratings. See id.
154. See id.
155. Brian Stelter, Now Playing on YouTube: Clips with Ads on the Side, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
2008, at C1 (“90 percent of the copyright claims made using the identification tool remain on the site
and are converted to advertising inventory.”). In prior scholarship, I have identified the “hedge”
practices of copyright holders who intentionally allow unauthorized uses of their works in order to
benefit from such unauthorized uses. See Lee, Warming Up, supra note 128, at 1486–87. The uses,
although unauthorized at the start, become informally accepted by the copyright holders, and further
undermine the notion that infringement always occurs in an unauthorized use. See id. at 1486–88.
Copyright practices must be judged over time.
156. See infra Part III.B.2.
157. Some exceptions, such as Hulu, do exist. See supra note 144.
158. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
159. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005).
160. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207, 209 (1996) (“[T]he fair-use criteria are so ambulatory that no one can give a general answer.”).
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2. The IT Sector’s Importance to the U.S. Economy
Another important macroeconomic reason for recognizing
technological fair use is that it can provide much-needed breathing room
for innovation in one of the most important sectors of the U.S. economy
today: information technology (“IT”).
Although the copyright industries are important to the U.S. economy,
they are not the only component. According to Bureau of Economic
Analysis statistics, between 2003 and 2008, the informationcommunication-technology-producing industries contributed between 3.7
and 3.8 percentage points each year to the growth of the real Gross
Domestic Product (“GDP”).161 By contrast, during that same period, the
motion picture and sound recording industries contributed just 0.3
percentage points.162 In other words, the IT sector contributed ten times
more to U.S. real GDP growth than some of the major copyright industries
over the same period.
The IT sector also remained comparatively strong during the recent
economic downturn. In 2007, “the computer and electronic products
manufacturing industry increased 20 percent, and the information and dataprocessing services industry increased 26 percent, which was more than
any other industry.”163 Even during the most recent economic downturn,
the information-communication-technology industries “remained strong in
2008,” seeing a 9.0 percent increase in value added and “contribut[ing] 30
percent to the 1.1 percent growth in real GDP,” despite comprising only 3.8
percent of GDP.164
These numbers indicate that any sound economic policy for the United
States must attempt to continue to spur the growth of the IT sector. Formal
recognition of technological fair use would be one important principle to
serve that end. It would be foolish to cut off our IT growth to spite our
copyright system.

161. See BEA, GROSS-DOMESTIC-PRODUCT-BY-INDUSTRY ACCOUNTS (2009), available at
http://www.bea.gov/industry/gpotables/gpo_action.cfm?anon=506869&table_id=24753&format_type=
0.
162. See id.
163. Soo Jeong Kim et al., Annual Industry Accounts: Revised Statistics for 2005–2007, SURV.
CURRENT BUS., Dec. 2008, at 21, 21–22, available at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2008/12December/
1208_indyaccts.pdf.
164. Manufacturing Industries Led Slowdown in 2008: Advance Gross Domestic Product by
Industry, 2008, BEA, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/industry/gdpindustry/2009/
gdpind08.htm.
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3. A Response to Gordon’s Market Failure Theory of Fair Use
My economic argument in favor of technological fair use does not
depend on the existence of market failure. This is a key criterion in Wendy
Gordon’s influential market failure approach to fair use, which examines
whether “(1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is
socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial
injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner.”165 When first
proposed, Gordon viewed all three factors as necessary before a fair use
should be recognized.166 With respect to new technologies, Gordon advised
courts to take a cautious approach before recognizing fair use so that, over
time, market mechanisms could develop, thereby enabling copyright
holders eventually to exact licensing of their works for use in new
technologies.167 “If copyright protection is denied because of an otherwise
curable market failure, then the additional revenues that would have flowed
[to the copyright holders] from the new technological use will not
appear.”168
Gordon’s influential article has elicited a wealth of commentary over
the years,169 including a more recent article from Gordon backtracking
somewhat from her original argument.170 It goes beyond this Article’s
scope to canvas or critique all of the rich literature related to Gordon’s
theory. Instead, I would like to focus on why Gordon’s market failure test
is inadequate to deal with technological fair use cases. Although I believe
market failure can be a factor for consideration, it should not supplant the
balance of factors, or become the be-all, end-all of fair use.
Part of the problem with the market failure test is that it runs the risk
of giving copyright industries too much (unwarranted) control over
165. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982).
166. Id. at 1620–21 (“[T]he courts should limit their grants of fair use to those occasions in which
the market cannot be relied upon to allow socially beneficial uses to occur.”).
167. Id. at 1621–22. Paul Goldstein goes one step further in suggesting that copyright law should
generally extend to new technological uses (though he is skeptical of the courts’ ability to handle this
issue). See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 188–89, 199–200. At times, Gordon appears to be a little more
sanguine about allowing fair use for new technologies because, at least in the beginning, high
transaction costs might hamper the ability of users to negotiate licenses from copyright holders. See
Gordon, supra note 165, at 1628–29.
168. Gordon, supra note 165, at 1621.
169. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 975 (2002).
170. See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs
Have Always Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 153–56 (2003).
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emerging technologies. The test views the relevant market as simply the
market for the copyrighted work, but it ignores the emerging market for the
new technology. Whether copyright holders can license their works cannot
answer the question of whether an emerging market for a new technology
might develop better without such licenses or control by copyright holders.
Under a more informed approach, the ability to obtain copyright licenses is
a relevant consideration, but so is whether fair use can help foster
technological innovation in a new or incipient market.
Although I have offered economic justifications for technological fair
use, the doctrine is, in the end, much more than that. The biggest flaw in
transforming fair use into a market failure test is that fair use is a First
Amendment safeguard, not some economic indicator. Under our First
Amendment jurisprudence, we do not use the market to decide whether
speech or a speech technology is permissible. Instead, the Constitution
values speech and technologies that facilitate expression in a different way
than the market does.171 Gordon conceded as much:
Distrust of the market may also be triggered when the defendant’s
activities involve social values that are not easily monetized. When the
defendant’s use contributes something of importance to public
knowledge, political debate, or human health, it may be difficult to state
the social worth of that contribution as a dollar figure. If the defendant’s
interest impinges on a first amendment interest, relying upon the market
may become particularly inappropriate; constitutional values are rarely
well paid in the marketplace and, while the citizenry would no doubt be
willing to pay to avoid losing such values, it is awkward at best to try to
put a “price” on them. Not surprisingly, it has been suggested that fair
use be granted when first amendment issues are involved.172

However, Gordon’s theory failed to recognize how speech technologies
implicate this First Amendment concern.173
To reduce fair use into a simple market failure test would strip the
doctrine of its traditional role as a First Amendment safeguard. There
would be little, if any, breathing room for speech technologies. If, as
171. Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at 386–87.
172. Gordon, supra note 165, at 1631–32 (footnotes omitted).
173. Gordon advised that “‘public interest’ cannot provide a justification for fair use unless there
is a reason to believe that the market cannot be relied upon to serve that interest.” Id. at 1636. In her
more recent writing, Gordon has admitted that some situations might involve “inherent limitation[s]”
that are entirely inappropriate for market-based norms, such as treating babies as commodities. See
Gordon, supra note 170, at 152. Gordon also recognized that “where non-economic values are at stake,
we might feel very uneasy trusting that market transactions could achieve the desired goals” and,
accordingly, “even if market conditions were perfect, it would be normatively appropriate to proceed
outside the market’s ordinary process of consent and payment.” Id. at 160.
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Gordon originally proposed, courts should defer to the market and the
eventual development of licensing mechanisms, technology developers
could expect to have to seek a license for every new use of a work, even if
no practicable licensing mechanism presently exists. Faced with that
prospect, technology companies and developers might stop investing in
research and development for speech technologies and devote their
resources elsewhere. Gordon’s theory seems to overlook this prospect
because it focuses heavily on licensing to users of works but not to the
developers of speech technologies.174
The market failure approach may produce another troubling situation
in technological fair use cases: entanglement between copyright holders
and how speech technologies are designed. The market failure approach
places a premium on negotiation with copyright holders for licensing uses
of their works.175 Some copyright industries may seek to dictate not just
uses of their works, but also the design features of new technologies, as
was the case with Sony,176 and more recently with TiVo,177 ReplayTV,178
Cablevision and other DVR manufacturers,179 as well as Amazon’s
Kindle.180 Innovative technological features may often be sacrificed by
technology companies to avoid—or buy off—potentially unmeritorious but
costly lawsuits. Given this past history, the goal of certain copyright
industries sometimes appears to be not to license their works but to shut
down a technology or new functionality that may have valuable social
benefits but to which they object.
Whatever the strategy of copyright holders, their entanglement with
174. See Gordon, supra note 165, at 1621.
175. See id. at 1629–30. Although Gordon recognizes other forms of market failure, her
discussion of new technologies focuses on allowing the opportunity for copyright holders to develop
market mechanisms to license their works. See id. at 1621.
176. See PATRY, supra note 5, at 150–51 (describing how movie studios tried to get Sony to adopt
their DiscoVision, which did not allow recording, in lieu of Sony’s Betamax, which did).
177. See Hyangsun Lee, The Audio Broadcast Flag System—Can It Be a Solution?, 12 COMM. L.
& POL’Y 405, 465–66 (2007) (discussing how TiVo dropped its portable TiVoToGo feature, which
enabled recorded content to be portable, after pressure from the Hollywood industry).
178. See Lemley, supra note 38, at 150–54 (discussing copyright lawsuits against ReplayTV’s
“Send Show,” “AutoSkip,” and “Library” features). See also Eric A. Taub, ReplayTV’s New Owners
Drop Features That Riled Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at C3 (explaining that ReplayTV
stopped offering the first two of these functions to its users in response to pressures from the
entertainment industry).
179. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008)
(denying copyright claim against Cablevision’s remote storage DVR).
180. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing how Amazon decided to give copyright
holders the option to disable the Kindle’s text-to-speech feature).
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how speech technologies are designed is troubling from a First Amendment
perspective. The history of abuses in England in allowing the Stationers’
Company, the de facto copyright holders, to control the printing press was
precisely what led to the recognition of the freedom of the press, first in
England and then in the United States.181 Thus, copyright holders’ control
over speech technologies raises serious constitutional red flags.
IV. FAIR USE TAILORED TO TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE
CLAIMS
One of the most difficult questions in all of copyright is how to
determine if a new technological use of copyrighted works should be
assimilated into the copyright holder’s exclusive rights. For over two
centuries of our copyright law’s existence, this question has recurred—
from the pianola and record player to the camera, radio, cable television,
copy machine, VCR, and Internet. Much like the mythical hydra, the
question rears its several heads over copyright law without end—tackle one
difficult technology, and another one pops up. Scholars who prefer strong
copyright protection, such as Paul Goldstein, advocate for a general policy
of assimilating all or most new technological uses of copyrighted works
into the copyright holder’s rights.182 However, this view is hard to square
with past copyright decisions, which over the years have resulted in a much
more varied—and permissive—approach to new technological uses.183
More importantly, it is harder to square with the goals of the First
Amendment and the Copyright and Patent Clause, which, as explained
above in Part III, are meant to provide breathing room for the development
of speech technologies. By the same token, the opposite approach—
assimilating all new technological uses as fair uses or exemptions from
copyright—would be equally hard to justify, as it would threaten to shrink
copyright as innovation continues to progress and new uses eventually
replace old ones.
The better approach lies somewhere in between these two extremes.
Copyright must allow breathing room for the development of speech
technologies but without immoderately shrinking copyright protections.184
181.
182.
183.

See supra Part III.A.1.a.
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 35, at 188–89, 199–200.
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1616 (2001) (“Indeed, a review of past confrontations between copyright and
new technological means of dissemination suggests that courts often are reluctant to restrain the public
availability of new technologies, even when those technologies appear principally designed to exploit
copyrighted works.” (footnote omitted)).
184. Although this Article focuses on fair use, the issue is not simply a choice between fair use or
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The hard task is separating the wheat from the chaff.185 This part offers a
framework to assist courts in that endeavor.
A. A PROPOSAL FOR COURTS
My basic proposal is that courts recognize a discrete category of
technological fair use. Although fair use remains a case-by-case inquiry,
the four factors can be tailored more specifically to address recurring issues
raised by speech technologies, similar to how the Supreme Court tailored
the factors for parodies in Campbell.186 Even though parody is not an
express purpose of fair use listed in § 107, courts have correctly identified
it as a legitimate type of fair use.187 Likewise, courts should identify
technological fair use as a legitimate type of fair use.
Of course, the tailoring of the factors for new speech technologies
does not mean that the presence of a new technology automatically
warrants a finding of fair use. The factors must still be applied in each case.
As an “equitable rule of reason,”188 the factors must be balanced and
weighed by the judge(s) or jury, so it is unrealistic to expect that my
proposal will yield clear, indisputable outcomes like a mathematical
formula. Instead, I hope to offer the right set of questions for courts to ask
when analyzing fair use, so courts can better appreciate what is at stake.189
Before getting to my framework, one legal distinction is worth noting:
the difference between direct and secondary liability. Even though different
legal standards apply, my framework is relevant for both claims. A direct
liability claim alleges that the developer itself has violated at least one of
infringement. A court may rule that none of the exclusive rights of copyright has even been violated,
thereby obviating the need for analyzing fair use. See infra notes 366–67 and accompanying text.
185. It goes beyond this Article’s scope to critique the few previous proposals on this topic. For
these proposals, see, for example, Lemley, supra note 38, at 157–62 (proposing an “innovative medium
defense” to protect developers); Timberg, supra note 36, at 226–40 (proposing a bifurcated approach
that recognizes a broad right of fair use for copyrighted works and providing compensation to copyright
holders in some appropriate cases of economic injury); Unified Theory, supra note 36, at 460–68
(proposing a normative framework encompassing interaction-iteration and noncommercial-commercial
factors). Von Lohmann stops short of a proposal, but argues in favor of applying fair use more
generously to allow “private copying” technologies. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 861–64.
186. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–94 (1994).
187. See, e.g., id. at 579–80; Lebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 110 (2d Cir.
1998) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. 569).
188. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
189. Given the speed at which technologies change today, it would be unwise to devise any test or
rule that did not have flexibility to accommodate new technologies and unforeseen developments. See
Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1332–33 (2002)
(describing some of the difficulties posed by rapid technological change).
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the exclusive rights of copyright, whereas a secondary liability claim
alleges that users of a technology have so violated a right and that the
developer should also be held liable.190 Fair use is a defense to direct
liability.191 But because secondary liability requires proof of direct
infringement,192 fair use is also relevant to secondary claims. In addition,
fair use is relevant to the Sony safe harbor, which protects technology
developers from secondary liability for technologies that have substantial
noninfringing uses, such as a fair use.193 Accordingly, although the
distinction between direct and secondary liability is important in deciding
infringement claims, the legal standard of fair use is the same in either
situation.194 My proposal for technological fair use applies to both kinds of
claims.
My proposal for analyzing technological fair use is summarized in
table 1 below. A fuller explanation of each fair use factor follows.
190. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining the categories of
liability as “direct copyright infringement, contributory and vicarious copyright infringement”).
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
192. See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1076 (explaining the elements of contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement).
193. See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. Given the Sony safe harbor, a developer may
have greater protection against secondary liability than direct liability.
194. Often, the strategy of copyright holders is to sue the technology developer instead of the user,
so even in secondary liability cases the developer may be the one asserting fair use on behalf of its
users. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (considering
claims that time-shifting recording of television shows by VCR users constituted fair use).
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TABLE 1. Framework for Analyzing Technological Fair Use
Factor One:
(a) Is the use of the copyrighted work for a new or value-adding purpose of
creating, operating, or providing output of a speech technology or
application?
(b) If so, can a potential public benefit from the technology be reasonably
perceived?
(c) Identify if the use is for creating, operating, or providing output of the
technology and give more leeway to creational/operational use.
(d) Give less weight to the commerciality of the use unless the technology is
offered at a high fee (this may cut against fair use). Some weight is
accorded to free technologies (this may cut in favor of fair use).
Factor Two:
The nature of the copyrighted work has less weight.
Factor Three:
Evaluate the amount/substantiality of the copying in light of the purpose
measured by factor one and along the Creation-Operation-Output spectrum.
Factor Four:
Evaluate the effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work (and
derivatives) and the effect on the potential market for the speech
technology.

1. Factor One: Purpose and Character of Use of the Copyrighted Work
Analyzed Under the Creation-Operation-Output Spectrum
Factor one of fair use is “the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes.”195 In his empirical study of fair use cases, Barton
Beebe found a strong correlation between factor one and the outcomes in
fair use cases: “Indeed, 95.3% of the 148 opinions that found that factor
one disfavored fair use eventually found no fair use, while 90.2% of the
opinions that found that the factor favored fair use eventually found fair
use.”196 If factor one usually determines or coincides with the outcome in
practice, then it is important to tailor this factor with enough detail for
courts to ask the right questions in technological fair use cases.
Accordingly, I have broken down factor one into four related
195. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
196. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 549, 597 (2008).
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considerations.
a. New or Value-Adding (Transformative) Purpose: Is the Use for the
Purpose or Function of Creating, Operating, or Providing an Output of a
Technology or Application?
A court should first examine whether the use of a copyrighted work is
for a new or value-adding purpose of creating, operating, or providing an
output of a speech technology or application. If it is not, no claim of
technological fair use is present, and the court should proceed to analyze
the case under the ordinary standard for fair use. However, if it does
contain such a purpose, this factor weighs in favor of technological fair
use—though, in varying degrees and with the rest of the factors still to be
considered.
Some courts have called this kind of purpose a “transformative”
purpose.197 The terminology has produced a considerable amount of
criticism and confusion.198 The confusion stems from use of
“transformative” to mean different things, depending on whether it
modifies “use” or “purpose.”199 When modifying “use,” transformative
describes what is commonly known as a “productive” use, meaning that the
defendant has used the copyrighted work to produce a new work, such as a
parody of a copyrighted work.200 But when modifying “purpose,” courts
have used “transformative” to describe situations without productive uses
where the copyrighted work is copied verbatim, sometimes in its entirety;
the transformation—or something new—arises in the purpose of using the
work, such as in a technology with a new function in how the work is
used.201
If courts were starting from scratch, perhaps they would be better
served by avoiding the use of the word “transformative” to describe both
purposes and uses under fair use. However, because courts already have
used this terminology in technological fair use cases, I will continue to do
197. See, e.g., A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639 (4th Cir. 2009).
198. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response,
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 449 (2008) (arguing that transformativeness should not be treated as a
binary concept but rather interpreted as a matter of degree—“the amount of interpretive distance that
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s work creates”); Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent:
Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497 (2008) (arguing that noncommercial
production can signal a transformative purpose); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things
Change, the Less They Seem “Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 251 (1998) (explaining how transformativeness is both over- and underinclusive).
199. The terms “use” and “purpose” appear in § 107(1).
200. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994).
201. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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so for ease of incorporation of my framework into existing doctrine.
However, my theory does not depend on whether “transformative purpose”
is accepted. I am happy to substitute “new or value-adding” purpose
instead.
This approach is consistent with the text of the fair use provision. The
Copyright Act expressly includes both the “purpose” and “character of the
use” as relevant considerations,202 which trace back to Justice Story’s idea
of looking to the “objects” and “nature” of the use in the precursor to the
fair use doctrine.203 In addition, the basic exemption of fair use in the first
sentence of § 107 lists several different “purposes” of fair use.204 Thus, as a
textual matter, the purpose of the use is an express factor for consideration
under the Copyright Act. As the Supreme Court stated in Campbell,
“transformative” means that it “adds something new,” which has “a further
purpose or different character.”205 The Court’s use of the “or” indicates two
different alternatives: purpose or character. In addition, the phrase
“supersede[s] the objects” of the original creation focuses on the purposes
of the original creation.206
In sum, the important consideration of factor one is that courts ask
whether the use of a copyrighted work is for a new or value-adding purpose
of creating, operating, or providing output of a technology or application. If
so, the fair use analysis should be tailored for technological fair uses.
b. Public Benefit: Can One Reasonably Perceive a Potential Public
Benefit from the Technology or Application?
Next, the court asks whether one can reasonably perceive a potential
public benefit from the technology in question. Fair use has traditionally
202. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
203. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
204. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship,
[and] research”).
205. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 572, 579 (1994) (emphasis added).
206. Id. (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348). True, the
Court’s reference to “the new work” might indicate a limitation to productive fair uses. Id. However,
the Court’s phrase “altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message” seems broad enough to
encompass the “new meaning” of copyrighted works in some technological fair use cases (for example,
within antiplagiarism software, the underlying works have the “new meaning” of data for a computer to
detect cheating or plagiarism in schools). Id. Although the Court noted “[t]he obvious statutory
exception to this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for
classroom distribution,” the Court here specified transformative uses, not purposes. Id. at 579 n.11. In
the end, the Court’s analysis of transformative purpose is ambiguous—which may explain the
confusion in the lower courts.
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included a consideration of public benefit,207and a number of courts that
have considered technological fair use claims have done so as well, perhaps
even more prominently.208
So what exactly is a public benefit? It is probably unwise to attempt to
define precisely the term, given the myriad of potential circumstances that
arise under fair use. But the basic idea in this context is that the technology
in question has societal value in some way for the public at large, not just
for the technology developer or, for that matter, the copyright industries.
Because of the Copyright and Patent Clause’s limitation of promoting the
progress of science and useful arts, our copyright and patent laws have
always placed the goal of serving the public above individual private
interest as the ultimate goal of both systems.209 Accordingly, the fair use
doctrine has always had an overriding goal of serving the public by acting
as a First Amendment safeguard within copyright law and as a doctrine to
promote the progress of science.210 Indeed, there would be no need for the
fair use doctrine at all if the public were deemed irrelevant to copyright
law’s scope. In economic terms, analyzing whether a public benefit is
derived from a new technology or application can help to identify the
positive externalities of a technology.211
The more difficult question is whether the court should attempt to
weigh or valuate the extent of the public benefit that is derived or likely to
be derived from the new technology. And if so, should the court then
attempt to balance the public benefit against any potential cognizable harm
to the copyright holder and its traditional market? The law-and-economics
school might favor such an approach, which resembles a cost-benefit
analysis of sorts. Moreover, the general test of fair use is one in which the
207. See Latman, supra note 58, at 7 (“[A]s a condition of obtaining the statutory grant, the author
is deemed to consent to certain reasonable uses of his copyrighted work to promote the ends of public
welfare for which he was granted copyright.”). See also, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Like less
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody] can provide social benefit, by shedding light on an
earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (“The District Court’s conclusions are buttressed by the fact that to the
extent time-shifting expands public access to freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal
benefits.”).
208. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721–22 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly
v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
209. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. See generally Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing
Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (2003) (offering a critical review of our copyright system’s
effectiveness in serving the public).
210. See supra Part III.A.
211. See Gordon, supra note 165, at 1630 (“When a defendant’s works yield such ‘external
benefits,’ the market cannot be relied upon as a mechanism for facilitating socially desirable
transactions.” (footnote omitted)).
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“factors are all weighed in the ‘equitable rule of reason’ balance.”212
In my view, however, courts should not get in the business of trying to
valuate the potential public benefit derived from a new technology or
perform a straight-out cost-benefit analysis in determining fair use. First, it
is beyond judicial competence to attempt to quantify or measure, with any
specificity, the public benefit that might accrue from a new technology.
New technologies are often unpredictable; their most significant and lasting
benefits are often unforeseen when first introduced.213 Second, even lawand-economics scholars have conceded that economic analysis of
intellectual property is often “inconclusive, if not indeterminate.”214
Finally, trying to compare the value or benefit of a speech technology to
what harm might impact the copyright holder’s market is doomed to failure
because the two factors are simply incommensurable. Because of the First
Amendment, we value speech and speech technologies in a much different
way than dollars.215 Even law-and-economics scholars concede that costbenefit analysis is unable to evaluate rights or nonwelfare values.216
So how, then, should a court judge a public benefit? To borrow the
Court’s standard in parody cases, I think courts should determine whether a
public benefit from the technology “may reasonably be perceived.”217 If so,
212. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.
213. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 131, at 131; Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, supra note 5, at
403 (“Courts are neither technologists nor good predictors of innovation or new technologies.”); R.
Anthony Reese, The Problems of Judging Young Technologies: A Comment on Sony, Tort Doctrines,
and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 877, 887 (2005) (discussing how courts “are
unlikely to be able to quantify a technology’s actual costs and benefits, or perhaps even their relative
magnitudes, with any degree of certainty”). Internet-related technologies are especially difficult to
predict given how rapidly they evolve. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 671 (2004) (discussing the
problems of fact-finding in Internet cases, given that “[t]he technology of the Internet evolves at a rapid
pace”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (commenting on how the Internet’s communication
and information retrieval methods are “constantly evolving”).
214. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 10 (2003) (noting “[t]he complexity of the subject and the degree to
which economic analysis of intellectual property remains inconclusive, if not indeterminate” (footnote
omitted)). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL.
103, 104 (1999) (arguing that “[i]gnorance [in the economic analysis of intellectual property] thus
should lead us to leave well enough alone”); David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69
MO. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (criticizing the consequentialist rhetoric in copyright law that leads to a “legal
endgame” in which “[w]hoever has to prove the unprovable facts is likely to lose”).
215. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 831
(1994) (“If we value speech either as an intrinsic good or because it is instrumental to a wellfunctioning deliberative process, we will value it in a quite different way from toasters.”).
216. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 154–62 (2006).
217. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994).
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then this part of the analysis favors fair use. If not, the analysis here is
either neutral or militates against fair use.
The “reasonably perceived” standard is meant to be a low threshold,
an approach consistent with providing breathing room for developers and
allowing new technologies to evolve. This approach also avoids putting
judges in the position of evaluating the value of speech technologies, which
might, in itself, raise First Amendment problems. As the Campbell Court
noted, the reasonably perceived standard is analogous to the judicial
nondiscrimination principle articulated by Justice Holmes in Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co.—a principle that keeps judges from
evaluating the artistic merit or worth of copyrighted works “outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits.”218 In addition, Judge Posner has
explained that “the fair-use doctrine is not intended to set up the courts as
judges of the quality of expressive works” under copyright law because it
“would be an unreasonable burden to place on judges, as well as raising a
First Amendment question.”219 For similar reasons, I believe we should
avoid having courts attempt to evaluate the value of different speech
technologies. Judges should not be asked to discriminate among speech or
speech technologies “outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”220
The reasonably perceived standard for finding a public benefit in a speech
technology is all that we should expect, and allow, from judges.221
That is not to say the court must disregard the potential scale of the
public benefit that may be derived. Some technologies may be pioneer
inventions that have the potential to transform society in immensely
beneficial ways, whereas other technologies may be more incremental in
effect. For example, the Internet is more revolutionary today than eighttrack tapes ever were. The Court in Sony did consider the potential size of
the public benefit of the VCR, but only in a general way and not in direct
comparison to the potential harm to the copyright holders.222 Simply citing
a past case, the Court concluded that greater access to free broadcast
218. Id. (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)).
219. Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 523 (7th Cir. 2002).
220. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582.
221. It is interesting to note the Court’s comparable deferential approach to government takings of
property for “public use”—asking whether or not the governmental plan serves a “public purpose.” See
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005) (interpreting permissible “public use” under the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The standard for the takings doctrine adopts a broad approach
to “public.” Id.
222. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (“One may
search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of millions of people who
watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have
enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.”).
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programs was in the public interest, but without attempting to put a value
on that interest.223 Although the Sony Court did not use a reasonably
perceived standard, its relaxed standard for recognizing a public benefit is
consistent with this approach. Additionally, a similarly relaxed approach to
finding a public benefit has been applied in some of the other technological
fair use cases discussed above.224
Some may object that my low threshold for finding a public benefit
may mean that every speech technology developed will have a plus factor
in favor of fair use. Perhaps, but one can imagine that certain technologies
that might fail the Sony safe harbor (for example, because they do not have
a substantial noninfringing use at all) will be deemed to lack a public
benefit. Also, a technology that was used privately and not shared with
others might be found to lack a public benefit. In any event, even if most
speech technologies do have a public benefit, that is a consequence, I
believe, of the First Amendment and how much the Constitution values
speech technologies.
c. Superseding Use Analyzed Along the Creation-Operation-Output
Spectrum
After a court has determined the threshold question of whether the
technology in question has a new or value-adding purpose that provides a
potential public benefit, the court should then ask whether the use of the
copyrighted work supersedes the purposes of the original work. This
inquiry dovetails somewhat with factor four of fair use—effect on the
copyright holder’s market (discussed below). It is also the flipside of the
“transformative” factor that asks whether the use of the copyrighted work
“merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation” instead of
adding new value or purpose to it.225 By definition, using a copyrighted
work in a highly transformative manner is more likely to be
nonsuperseding.
223. Id. at 454 (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972)).
224. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]
search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new work, namely, an
electronic reference tool.”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that
the use of images for a visual search “benefit[ed] the public by enhancing information-gathering
techniques on the internet”); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992)
(“Public benefit need not be direct or tangible, but may arise because the challenged use serves a public
interest.” (citation omitted)); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1119 (D. Nev. 2006)
(commenting that Google’s cache functionality “serves different and socially important purposes in
offering access to copyrighted works”).
225. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841)).
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In analyzing superseding use in a technological fair use case, one of
the key determinations is to identify the stage(s) of the technology’s
development during which the claimed fair use is made—(1) creation,
(2) operation, or (3) output. Developers should have more leeway or
breathing room, on average, during the creation and operation stages than
during the output stage. Although technological fair uses can occur at the
output stage, as with home recordings on the VCR in Sony, the output
analysis may raise greater concerns about potential superseding uses that
approximate one of the copyright holder’s exclusive rights or traditional
markets. As depicted below in table 2, the Creation-Operation-Output
categories represent a spectrum.
TABLE 2. Creation-Operation-Output Spectrum
Creational Uses
Greater Leeway
for Fair Use

Operational Uses

Output Uses
Less Leeway
for Fair Use

Creational uses, meaning uses of a copyrighted work simply to create
a technology, without more, are probably the least likely to be superseding.
The reason is that uses of copyrighted works solely at the creation stage of
a technology—during the process of creating the technology—are more
likely to be purely functional uses necessary to creating the new
technology. As such, creational uses fall within the subject matter of patent,
not copyright, if protection is sought. Sega provides an example of a purely
creational use. Copies of Sega’s operating system were made only during
the reverse engineering stage to identify functional (and unpatented and
uncopyrightable) elements of the program.226 The functional elements were
then used to create a new application that could work on Sega’s
machine.227 The defendant’s copies of Sega’s copyrighted program were in
this sense only “intermediate,” as the court noted, because they were never
used beyond the reverse engineering and creation stage.228 No copies were
226. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1514–16.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1518. Intermediate copies used to create a new technology are distinguishable from
interim copies of copyrighted works that are just used in the process of making the final copy. Cf. Walt
Disney Prods. v. Filmation Assocs., 628 F. Supp. 871, 876 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (materials created were
interim copies of film to be used in final production). As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Sega, a key
difference is that the former involves intermediate copying to deal with functional items not within the
scope of copyright but necessary to create a new technology or application. See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1518–
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later used in operating the defendant’s game or as an output to end users.229
Operational uses of copyrighted works in technologies fall near the
middle of the spectrum, but in terms of having a lower potential of
superseding the copyrighted work, fall closer to the side of creational uses.
This is so because a purely operational use of copyrighted works, without
any output of the works to the end user, is more likely to be a functional
use of the work—meaning here that they function as a part of the operation
of the technology. Operational uses are different from creational uses in
that operational uses occur during the operation of the technology once it
has already been created.230 For example, the VCR can record shows from
televisions during operation. Because operational uses typically occur with
some output to the end user (such as how, after recording, the VCR’s
output is a taped program), it is difficult to find uses that are purely
operational, where the only use of a copyrighted work is made internally
within the machine. One example is the creation of temporary copies of
materials as they are transmitted through various parts—or the “pipes”—of
the Internet. This example involves a purely operational use if the parts of
the Internet through which material is transmitted do not involve the output
of the content to the end users.231 Another simplified example of a purely
19.
229. Purely creational uses are somewhat difficult to find outside of reverse engineering.
Typically, a copyrighted work is also used during the operation and output of the technology, such as
with the finding and displaying of content through search engines. However, one hypothetical example
of a purely creational use would be using copyrighted works—such as an encyclopedia—to increase the
knowledge of a computer programmed with artificial intelligence. If the computer simply “learned”
from the works, without continual access to them in a database, such a use would be purely creational—
giving the computer artificial intelligence.
230. Some examples may straddle the line. For example, search engines and antiplagiarism
software continually add to their databases even after their technologies have been created. See, e.g.,
Turnitin, The WriteCycle Collaborative Writing Solution, http://turnitin.com/static/products.html (last
visited May 1, 2010) (discussing antiplagiarism system’s “continuously updated databases”); How
Search Engines Work, SEARCHENGINEWATCH.COM, Mar. 14, 2007, http://searchenginewatch.com/
2168031 (discussing the continual updating of search engines through “crawling” of Web pages).
Google created its search engine more than a decage ago, but it continues to add to its database by
automated software copying of Web pages. See Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a
Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 30 COMPUTER NETWORKS & ISDN SYS. 107 (April
1998), available at http://infolab.stanford.edu/~backrub/google.html (discussing Google’s system and
the need to “crawl” millions of Web pages for indexing). Is such copying creational or operational? An
argument can be made either way. However, I would categorize such copying as still creational in that
it continues to create the database to update the technology. By contrast, I prefer to use the term
operational for uses by the end users of the technology; such operational uses do not alter the
technology itself.
231. That is why operational uses of copyrighted works in computers and the Internet have often
been exempted or considered noninfringing. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2006) (excluding from liability
instances when the owner of a copy of a computer program makes or authorizes the making of another
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operational use is the processing of copyrighted materials in a paper
shredder or recycling plant.232 Copyrighted and other materials are
destroyed or recycled during operation of the technology, but it does not
provide output of copyrighted materials to end users. As a general matter,
greater leeway should be afforded to operational use.
Output uses fall on the other end of the spectrum and may raise greater
concern of a superseding use. Because an output use often results in some
distribution, display, or performance of the copyrighted work to the public,
such output may run the risk of superseding the traditional purposes of the
copyright holder’s rights in marketing the work to the public. Making
photocopies on a copier is an example of an output use. The machine
produces the output of copies, some of which may come from copyrighted
works. So too is the transmission of content over the radio and over cable
and broadcast television. Such transmissions are output uses of the content
to the public (there are also operational uses to the extent the content must
be transmitted through the technology from one location to another by
broadcast, cable, or other conduit). Technologies whose purpose is to
disseminate content are likely to involve output uses of copyrighted works.
Although my sliding scale still affords some leeway for output uses of
copyrighted works, it is less so, on average, when compared to the other
two types of uses.
Sometimes, perhaps even often, cases may involve some combination
of creational, operational, or output uses of copyrighted works. In such
cases, courts must be careful to identify the stages at which the various uses
copy as long as the copy is created “as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program”); id.
§ 512 (The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) safe harbors for passive conduits, caching,
storage, and locator tools). See also Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121,
131 (2d Cir. 2008) (“In determining who actually ‘makes’ a copy, a significant difference exists
between making a request to a human employee, who then volitionally operates the copying system to
make the copy, and issuing a command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and
engages in no volitional conduct.”); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1369–70 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that the doctrine of “volition” denies direct
infringement liability against technology developers for merely “designing or implementing a system
that automatically and uniformly creates temporary copies of all data sent through it”). The operational
use doctrine may also apply to DMCA safe harbors, thereby allowing certain automated uses of the
copyrighted works to still fall within the safe harbor. See, e.g., Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc.,
586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that automated conversion of video files and preview
images by a service provider did not disqualify it from a DMCA § 512(c) safe harbor).
232. This example may seem far fetched as a copyright issue. However, some arguments have
been made for extending the continental European notion of moral right of integrity to encompass the
destruction of copyrighted works. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better Than
Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 662–64 (2008) (describing the state of
authors’ moral rights).
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occur and analyze each stage along the spectrum according the appropriate
level of breathing room for each stage. For example, in the “thumbnail”
search engine cases such as Kelly, the developers created, as part of a new
search engine, a database of copied photographs in thumbnail size that
were later copied again and displayed on the screens of Internet users
operating the search engine, resulting in an output of the photographs only
in thumbnail size.233
Although my proposal of the Creation-Operation-Output spectrum
does not provide formulaic certainty, it does provide greater clarity
regarding how technological fair use cases should be judged, in a way that
balances the competing interests of copyright holders, technology
developers, and the public. My approach is also fairly consistent with the
outcomes in successful technological fair use cases, as table 3 below
depicts—which suggests that my framework and Creation-OperationOutput spectrum can be easily incorporated into existing case law.
TABLE 3. Summary of Successful Technological Fair Use Cases
Creational Uses

Operational Uses

Output Uses

None

Sony recording
(verbatim copies)

Sony (verbatim copies)

Sega reverse
engineering (verbatim
copies)

None

None

Unclear

Galoob enhanced
display

Galoob (limited)
(temporary display)

Kelly image search
engine (verbatim copies)

Kelly
(thumbnail stored)

Kelly (limited)
(thumbnail image)

Google caching
(verbatim copies)

Google (cache
temporarily stored)

Google (limited)
(static snapshot)

A.V. antiplagiarism
(verbatim copies)

A.V.
(verbatim stored)

A.V. (limited)
(plagiarism report)

All of the fair use cases with creational uses involved verbatim
copying of the entirety of the works. Likewise, all the operational uses
involving copies had either verbatim or more limited copies. Only Sony
involved the output of verbatim copies of the entire original works, albeit
233.

See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815 (9th Cir. 2003).
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for the noncommercial home use of time-shifting.234 Otherwise, all of the
cases had outputs that were more limited in some way (for example, size,
quality, time, and quantity) than the entirety of the original works.235
Moreover, the Kelly–Google search engine cases and the A.V.antiplagiarism case all involve a similar pattern of use: (1) verbatim copies
of copyrighted works in their entirety at creation in order to create a
database, (2) verbatim or more limited copies of relevant works during
operation and use of the database, but (3) a more limited output of the
works to the user or public. The visual search engine provided outputs of
thumbnail images in reduced size and quality;236 the caching search engine,
only a temporary static snapshot of the website;237 and the antiplagiarism
software, only the relevant passages that might have been plagiarized in the
student’s work.238 The patterns in these cases support my theory that, as a
rough (but not hard-and-fast) guide, fair use should afford more leeway to
developers at the creation and operation stages.
Likewise, as table 4 below depicts, the unsuccessful technological fair
use cases involved outputs that offered 100 percent of the original work or
a permanent copy of an entire derivative work to the public. The more
doubtful questions of technological fair use occur in these verbatim output
234. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Although there
has been much debate over whether building a library of recorded shows is infringing, the Court in
Grokster indicated that such activity was not necessarily infringing. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931 (2005) (noting that “[a]lthough Sony’s advertisements urged
consumers to buy the VCR to . . . ‘build a library’ of recorded programs, [this use was not] necessarily
infringing” (citation omitted)). This suggestion repudiated Judge Posner’s view that library building is
“unquestionably infringing.” In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).
235. The Galoob case was somewhat unique in that it involved the ability to alter temporarily the
display of video game features, but not permanently in any fixed copy; in that sense, it was more
limited. See Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992). The
legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 appears to contemplate that the right to make derivative
works may be violated even without a fixed copy. See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 58 (1975), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675 (“[The right to make a derivative work] is broader than that right [to
copy] . . . in the sense that reproduction requires fixation in copies or phonorecords, whereas the
preparation of a derivative work, such as a ballet, pantomi[m]e, or improvised performance, may be an
infringement even though nothing is ever fixed in tangible form.”). But the Senate report then went on
to state:
[T]o constitute a violation of [the exclusive right to prepare derivative works], the infringing
work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some form; for example, a
detailed commentary on a work or a programmatic musical composition inspired by a novel
would not normally constitute infringements under this clause.
Id.
236. Kelly, 336 F.3d 811 (thumbnail and lower-resolution pictures).
237. Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (cached snapshot of websites).
238. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). See also Turnitin,
Originality
Checking,
http://www.turnitin.com/resources/documentation/turnitin/sales/OC_one_
page.pdf (last visited May 1, 2010) (detailing Turnitin.com features).
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cases or in cases with outputs that resemble the traditional markets of the
copyright holder. Under my Creation-Operation-Output spectrum, they fall
at the far end of the spectrum and raise greater concern about a superseding
use than a case with a limited output. Yet, as Sony shows, even verbatim
output uses can be fair uses. Admittedly, my Creation-Operation-Output
spectrum alone cannot resolve the difficult question posed by verbatim
output uses.239 The question must be answered in light of consideration of
all the fair use factors, as well as the context. On average, the spectrum
allows less leeway for output uses, but it may still allow a verbatim output
in an appropriate case.
TABLE 4. Summary of Unsuccessful Technological Fair Use Cases
Creational Uses

Operational Uses

Output Uses

None

Napster file sharing
(verbatim copies)

Napster (verbatim
copies shared)

MP3.com space shifting
(verbatim copies)

MP3.com
(verbatim copies)

MP3.com
(verbatim copies
accessed)

CleanFlicks edited
movies (verbatim
copies)

CleanFlicks
(derivative works)

CleanFlicks
(derivative works)

Psystar Mac clones
(verbatim copies)

Psystar (close to
verbatim copies)

Psystar (close to
verbatim copies)

d. What Weight Should Be Given to Commercial Versus Nonprofit
Educational Purposes?
The next consideration under factor one in § 107 is “whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”240
Campbell downplays the significance of the commercial-versus-nonprofit
educational inquiry, at least in the context of parodies.241 Just as a
commercial use is not presumptively unfair, so too a nonprofit educational
239. For example, von Lohmann contends that fair use should condone the verbatim copying that
is enabled by private copying technologies, such as the iPod with music files and TiVo with its various
forms of time-shifting functions. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 835–40. Samuelson suggests a
trend in this direction. See Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 37, at 2602–05. I reserve judgment on
the matter.
240. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006).
241. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (explaining that
commercial use should not be viewed as determinative but instead as only one factor in a multifactor
analysis).
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use is not presumptively fair.242 The Court also stated that “the more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other
factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair
use.”243 Therefore, the commercial nature of the parody did not factor
much, if at all, into the analysis given the Court’s view that many
expressive works subject to parodies are commercial.244
I agree with the Campbell Court’s admonition that the commerciality
factor may often weigh less in the fair use analysis than the transformative
factor.245 For example, consider whether all the copies of copyrighted
works that are generated by the Internet through its automated
transmissions should be deemed fair uses. Whether or not the Internet had
been developed for commercial or nonprofit educational purposes, or both,
seems less significant than the general societal value that the Internet
provides. In the case of the Internet, the technology eventually served both
(and many more) purposes. Likewise, in the case of Google Book Search,
the profit-making company Google teamed up with an alliance of nonprofit
educational universities and public libraries to develop the vast database of
searchable texts.246 The value to society resulting from the ability to search
inside millions of texts probably would not change depending upon
whether a corporation or a nonprofit created it. As these examples
demonstrate, in evaluating fair use we must avoid giving undue weight to
the commerciality factor.
Commercial and nonprofit educational elements are not completely
irrelevant, however. I believe it is relevant to fair use whether the
technology in question is offered for free or instead at a high price to the
public. Just imagine that the visual search engines were only offered for a
charge of $500 per month. Not only would the potential public benefit of
the technology diminish given the access divide it may create between the
haves and have-nots, but also selling the technology at a very high price to
the public might cast some doubt on the worthiness of fair use. In essence,
the use is not really “fair” or reasonable because the public benefits so little
from it.247
242. Id.
243. Id. at 579.
244. See id. at 584–85.
245. See Beebe, supra note 196, at 606 (noting how twenty-six of twenty-eight fair use decisions
finding both transformativeness and commercial purpose present ultimately decided in favor of fair
use).
246. See infra note 323 and accompanying text.
247. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Commentary, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1137 (1990) (discussing fairness as a central consideration in finding a case of fair use).
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Conversely, a nonprofit educational purpose may cut in favor of fair
use. Imagine that the alliance of nonprofit universities, without Google,
were the only ones developing an Internet book search that was offered for
free to students and the public. That scenario might arguably weigh at least
slightly more in favor of fair use than a case involving a for-profit
corporation like Google, particularly if the nonprofit universities derived no
income or reimbursement for their book search.248 In this context, fair use
operates as a public works project of sorts.
In sum, in technological fair use cases, whether or not a use is made
for commercial or nonprofit educational purposes should not matter as
much as whether the speech technology in question has a new or valueadding purpose and provides a potential public benefit. However, at
opposite ends, charging the public high fees in a profit-making venture may
militate against fair use, whereas a technology offered for free or for a
nonprofit educational purpose may cut in favor of fair use.
e. Summary of Factor One
Thus, by the end of factor one, the court will have determined whether
the case involves a possible technological fair use, specifically: (1) whether
the alleged fair use has been made for the new or value-adding (that is,
transformative) purpose of creating, operating, or providing an output of a
technology or application; (2) whether the technology or application has a
potential public benefit that may be reasonably perceived; and (3) whether
the alleged fair use supersedes the purposes of the original work. In
considering these questions, a court should consider the stage at which the
work is used by or with the technology—the creation, operation, or output
of the technology, with more leeway offered typically at the creation and
operation stages. If a technology in question has a transformative (or valueadding) purpose in using the work in a way that provides a public benefit, it
cuts in favor of fair use. In such a case, (4) the commerciality of the use
tends to weigh less heavily in the analysis, except in cases where the
248. My approach is consistent with how courts have analyzed commerciality and nonprofit
educational purpose in practice. According to the Beebe study, “[A] commercial purpose (which was
made in 64.4% of the opinions) did not significantly influence the outcome of the fair use test in favor
of an overall finding of no fair use,” whereas “a finding that the defendant’s use was for a
noncommercial purpose (which was made in 15.4% of the opinions) . . . strongly influenced the
outcome of the test in favor of an overall finding of fair use.” Beebe, supra note 196, at 602 (emphasis
added). Rebecca Tushnet offers a compelling argument for greater recognition of the importance of the
noncommercial factor: “[M]ore important is that noncommercial creative uses, precisely because they
are not motivated by copyright’s profit-based incentives, are more likely to contain content that the
market would not produce or sustain . . . .” Tushnet, supra note 198, at 507.
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technology is offered to the public only at an exorbitant cost. Likewise, a
free technology or one offered for a nonprofit educational purpose (the
public-works-project rationale) cuts in favor of technological fair use.
2. Factor Two: Nature of the Copyrighted Work Has Less Weight
Factor two of fair use, which is “the nature of the copyrighted
work,”249 weighs less heavily in technological fair use cases. In the run-ofthe-mill case, courts tend to accord fictional or artistic works greater
copyright protection than factual works.250 Yet, as seen in the case of
parodies, courts sometimes minimize the weight of this factor, even for
fictional and artistic works.251 As the Campbell Court explained, this factor
is “not much help . . . or ever likely to help much” in determining what is
fair use in parody cases because parodies “almost invariably copy publicly
known, expressive works.”252
A similar approach should apply to technological fair use cases. If a
technology has a transformative or value-adding purpose, such as a visual
search engine or antiplagiarism technology, whether the works used are
factual or fictional/artistic is a poor way to determine whether the
technological use or technology should be allowed. For example, giving
greater leeway to a software developer to make fair uses by copying factual
works for use in antiplagiarism technology, but less leeway for fictional
works, seems irrational. An antiplagiarism technology that could only
detect plagiarism of factual works would leave a gaping hole for creative
writing courses, not to mention the commercial publishing of fictional
works, which sometimes involve plagiarism incidents. In either case,
plagiarism should be discouraged just as strongly for fictional and factual
writings. The general principle that the scope of copyright is narrower for
factual works (because facts are not protected) is misplaced when
unacknowledged, verbatim copying of academic writing is involved.253
Likewise, it seems arbitrary to allow as fair use time-shift home recordings
of documentaries, sporting events, news programs, and reality shows but
249. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
250. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (stating that “[t]his factor
calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others,
with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied” and
citing cases contrasting fictional and factual works).
251. See, e.g., id.
252. Id.
253. The Fourth Circuit found the factual/fictional distinction to be less important in analyzing the
second factor in the A.V. case. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 640 (4th Cir.
2009) (finding that “the creative nature of the work is mitigated” where antiplagiarism software used
the work only to detect plagiarism).
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not those of any fictional sitcoms or dramas. Being able to watch a
television program at home at a more convenient time is neither more nor
less deserving based on the type of show being broadcast. In short, the
nature of the copyrighted work in technological fair use cases should not
matter as much as it does in the typical case. One exception, however,
should be made with respect to functional works. Functional features do
not fall within the core of copyright and often are not even within the scope
of copyright at all, so more freedom should be allowed for their copying.254
3. Factor Three: Amount and Substantiality of the Work Copied, Judged
Under the Creation-Operation-Output Spectrum
Factor three is “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”255 As the Court explained,
factor three should be analyzed in conjunction with factor one because “the
extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the
use.”256 Courts consider both the quantity and quality or importance of
copied material in relation to the work as a whole.257 Yet quantity alone
sometimes correlates with fair use results. As the Beebe study found,
“[T]he more the defendant takes of the plaintiff’s work, the less likely it is
that the taking will qualify as a fair use.”258 However, as discussed above
for factor one, for technological fair use cases, the amount and
substantiality of the work copied should be analyzed at the stage of use of
the copyrighted work—whether during creation, operation, or output of the
technology, with more leeway offered at the creation and operation stages
than at the output stage. Verbatim copies are less worrisome at the creation
and operation stages than at the output stage.
4. Factor Four: Effect on the Potential Market for the Copyrighted Work
and Effect on the Potential Market for the Speech Technology
The fourth factor is “the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.”259 This factor “requires courts to
consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the particular
actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and
254. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992)
(discussing disassembly).
255. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
256. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87.
257. Id. at 587.
258. Beebe, supra note 196, at 615.
259. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
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widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ for the
original,” including the market for derivative works.260
Factor four has proven to be one of the most important factors,261 as
well as the most disputed. The major problem is the so-called circularity
problem: the copyright holder can always claim an economic harm from an
unlicensed use of its work, even in unformed markets or for unforeseen
uses of a work.262 Taken to an extreme, this reasoning creates a circularity
problem: nothing can be fair use because everything can be licensed.263 To
address this problem, the Second Circuit has held that the copyright holder
only has a claim of licensing in “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be
developed” markets.264 Whether this solves the circularity problem is
debatable.
In technological fair use cases, this problem becomes even more
pronounced because the technology in question often involves an emerging
market for which no prior copyright relations or practices have been
established. For example, Sony involved the emerging market for VCRs,265
the Kelly case involved the emerging market of visual search engines, and
the A.V. case involved the emerging market of antiplagiarism technology
for schools. In none of these cases did the emerging market involve the
formal commercial licensing of the vast majority of works in question. In
other words, in emerging markets, the parties are initially writing on a
blank slate. The question then becomes whether the copyright holder’s
exclusive rights should extend into the emerging market to control uses of
260. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4] (1993)).
261. The Beebe study suggests a strong correlation between factor four and the ultimate decision
on fair use. See Beebe, supra note 196, at 617 (noting that 140 of 141 cases finding that factor four
disfavored fair use ruled against fair use, while 110 of 116 cases finding it favored fair use eventually
found a fair use). Beebe suggests that factor four “essentially constitutes a metafactor under which
courts integrate their analyses of the other three factors and, in doing so, arrive at the outcome not
simply of the fourth factor, but of the overall test.” Id.
262. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1569, 1588–89 & n.78 (2009).
263. See Am. Geophyiscal Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–30, 929 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that not every effect on potential licensing revenues enters the analysis under the fourth factor);
James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882,
895–98 (2007).
264. Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930.
265. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S 417 (1984). The case took
eight years to litigate, during which time the market for VCRs evolved considerably. See Lee, Warming
Up, supra note 128, at 1483–84. Whether a practice is perceived as a fair use could change over time as
more people engage in the custom or practice.
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its works there. In some cases, the answer has been yes,266 but in other
cases, no.267
I do not attempt here to solve the circularity problem, except to
caution courts from giving undue weight to the practicability (or lack
thereof) of licensing works for use in a new technological market. Other
considerations should factor into the analysis.
First, in analyzing factor four, courts should consider whether the use
supersedes the objects of the original copyrighted work.268 As the Court in
Campbell noted, “[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of
the entirety of an original, it clearly ‘supersedes the objects’ . . . of the
original and serves as a market replacement for it, making it likely that
cognizable market harm to the original will occur.”269 But just as factor one
is judged in terms of the Creation-Operation-Output spectrum, so too is
factor four in technological fair use cases. Functional uses of copyrighted
works to create or operate a speech technology are less likely to be within
the purview of the copyright holder’s market.270 Copyright was not
intended to cover functional things or the realm of technological
innovation.271 Under the Free Press Clause, breathing room is necessary for
speech technologies to develop.272 By contrast, output uses of copyrighted
works may be more likely to raise issues of superseding use and market
harm to the value of the copyrighted work. Yet the manner of output (for
example, thumbnail-size images or brief snippets) and context in which it is
made (for example, home personal use, school use, or an Internet tool) are
still relevant.
Second, a court should consider the technology’s possible positive
effects on the potential market for the copyrighted work. Section 107 is not
limited to the harmful or negative effects of a particular use of a
copyrighted work—it simply says “effect.”273 Sometimes speech
technologies yield positive effects on the market for the original work, such
266. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
268. This consideration is also relevant to factor one. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
269. Id. (alteration in original omitted) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
270. See supra notes 226–32 and accompanying text.
271. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–28 (9th Cir. 1992).
272. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
273. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.”).
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as making the works easier for everyone to find and purchase. For example,
the VCR opened up a new market for television shows and movies by
facilitating a home rental and sale market.274 The technology was
“complementary,” in economic terms, to the copyrighted works.275
Finally, courts should consider the effect a finding against fair use
would have on the market for the speech technology in question. Although
this consideration is not expressly noted in the four factors,276 it is related
to the consideration in factor one of the public benefit from the use of the
work. Assuming that a court “reasonably perceives” a public benefit from a
technology under factor one, it is appropriate for the court to consider how
that public benefit from the technology might be affected by the disposition
of the case. For example, the Sony Court was rightfully concerned about
turning the VCR into contraband.277 This factor reminds courts of the need
to avoid allowing copyrights to have a patent-like effect in controlling
technologies.278 As discussed earlier, fair use operates as a First
Amendment safeguard within copyright law, acting as a safety valve to
protect free press and technology interests. A court should not ignore how a
ruling against fair use in a technology case might negatively affect, if not
destroy, an emerging market for a speech technology.
B. ROLE FOR CONGRESS
This Article focuses on improving the fair use doctrine to handle
technology cases mainly through the courts’ development of the doctrine,
as courts have traditionally done since the emergence of our copyright
system. In terms of a comparative institutional analysis,279 courts have
proven to be much better equipped to deal with rapid technological change,
incrementally, in specific cases, than Congress has legislatively.280
274. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
275. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 841 (“[I]ncreasing demand for one [product] results in
increasing demand for the other.”).
276. Congress gave courts the power to consider other factors in analyzing fair use by using the
language “include” before listing the four factors. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. See also Field v. Google Inc.,
412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1122 (D. Nev. 2006) (considering Google’s good faith as an “additional factor”
and stating that “[t]he Copyright Act authorizes courts to consider other factors than the four nonexclusive factors [listed in § 107]”).
277. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–56 (1984)
(concluding that the VCR yielded public benefits that should not be limited given the minimal
likelihood of harm to respondents’ copyrights).
278. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
279. For a definition of “comparative institutional analysis,” see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994).
280. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 134–39 (2004) (discussing
how a property rights approach may be preferable to a regulatory approach in certain instances). See
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Yet Congress also has an important role to play in ensuring that the
copyright system does not curb innovation in speech technologies.
Throughout the history of our copyright law, Congress has enacted specific
exemptions,281 safe harbors,282 and compulsory licenses to deal with
advances in new technologies that affect copyrighted works.283 On the
other hand, sometimes Congress “deals” with new technologies by
attempting to limit them or by providing greater protections for copyright
holders, as was the case with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.284
Although it goes beyond the scope of the Article to set forth a legislative
agenda for Congress, it is important for Congress to concentrate its efforts,
not on attempting to proscribe speech technologies, but instead on
protecting them through exemptions, safe harbors, and compulsory licenses
(or simply by adopting a hands-off approach). Fred von Lohmann’s
suggestion that Congress should adopt a policy to “innovate broadly first,
regulate narrowly later”285 seems sensible, especially when it is inherently
difficult to predict how new technologies will develop.
V. APPLYING TECHNOLOGICAL FAIR USE TO RECENT CASES
This part applies my proposed framework to two recent controversies:
Google Book Search (“GBS”) and Amazon’s text-to-speech function on the
Kindle e-reader. When analyzed under my framework, GBS itself involves
a legitimate technological fair use, but the digital copies of the scanned
works that Google transmits to participating libraries (the so-called library
copies) are not technological fair uses and may have more contestable
claims of fair use under the standard fair use analysis. Likewise, Amazon’s
Kindle also involves a technological fair use.

also David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1326–44 (2004)
(describing ineffective legislation enacted by Congress to address technological change). It goes beyond
this Article’s scope to evaluate whether more copyright rulemaking should be delegated to an
administrative agency, such as the Copyright Office. For an analysis of this issue, see, for example, Liu,
supra, at 148–59; Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
551, 556 (2007).
281. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2006) (providing an exemption for DVD skipping
technology).
282. See, e.g., id. § 512 (outlining the DMCA safe harbors for Internet service providers).
283. See, e.g., id. § 111(c) (compulsory license for secondary transmissions by cable television
operators).
284. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
285. See Von Lohmann, supra note 14, at 854.
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A. GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH
Although the GBS case was settled pending final approval of the court
after the class action fairness hearing,286 we should examine GBS under my
proposed framework to illustrate how the framework works in practice.
Because the settlement has drawn objections and an antitrust investigation
by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”),287 the fair use question is useful for
comparison’s sake.
The proposed settlement is incredibly complex and ambitious. The
DOJ, among others, objected to the original proposal on numerous grounds,
including copyright, antitrust, and class action requirements under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.288 To address these objections, the parties
offered a revised settlement,289 but the DOJ filed an objection to the revised
settlement as well.290
What is striking about the settlement is that it attempts not only to
settle the copyright dispute between Google and the plaintiffs, but also to
structure dramatically the industry for online book searching and solve (or
sidestep) the orphan works problem, an issue that Congress has considered
without success.291 That is why the DOJ described the settlement as “one of
the most far-reaching class action settlements of which the United States is
aware.”292 The DOJ went even further: “A global disposition of the rights
to millions of copyrighted works is typically the kind of policy change
implemented through legislation, not through a private judicial
286. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For an excellent summary of the original proposed
settlement, see James Grimmelmann, How to Fix the Google Book Search Settlement, 12 No. 10 J.
INTERNET L. 1, 11 (2009). For Google’s summary of the major revisions to the original settlement
proposal, see Posting of Dan Clancy to Google Public Policy Blog, http://googlepublicpolicy.
blogspot.com/ (Nov. 13, 2009, 23:54 EST) (search for “Revised Google Books Settlement” and select
“here” hyperlink in the third paragraph). On November 19, 2009, then–District Judge Denny Chin
granted preliminary approval of the Amended Settlement Agreement. Order Granting Preliminary
Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136-DC
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2009).
287. See Miguel Helft, U.S. Presses Antitrust Inquiry into Google Book Settlement, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2009, at B5.
288. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Class
Settlement, Authors Guild, No. 05 CV 8136-DC (Sept. 18, 2009) [hereinafter First DOJ Objection].
289. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32.
290. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed Amended
Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, No. 05 CV 8136-DC (Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Second DOJ
Objection].
291. See First DOJ Objection, supra note 288, at 6–7 (discussing “forward-looking business
arrangements” proposed by the settlement and the problem of orphan works).
292. Id. at 1.
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settlement.”293 Nonetheless, the DOJ believed that a properly structured
settlement in this case “offer[ed] the potential for important societal
benefits” and hoped the parties would revise the settlement to address the
DOJ’s objections.294
Under the amended settlement, Google can do much more
commercially with the copyrighted works than it could before the lawsuit,
but not without a price. Without admitting any liability, Google must pay a
minimum of $45 million to the plaintiff class for Google’s past use of
works in GBS.295 In addition, Google must pay $34.5 million to establish
the Book Rights Registry (discussed below) devised under the
settlement,296 as well as a maximum of $30 million for the plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees.297 Google is then allowed to display in “preview uses” not
just snippets of copyrighted works but up to 20 percent of the qualifying
works.298 The 20 percent default for such preview uses applies only to outof-print books, but not to in-print books, which are treated as “no display”
books unless the copyright holders give consent.299 In other words,
copyright holders of out-of-print books—including potentially orphan
works whose authors cannot be identified or located—must opt out of the
GBS in order to stop it from commercializing their works, while copyright
holders of in-print books enjoy the rights to opt in, with GBS not otherwise
allowed to commercialize in-print books.300
The opt-out default rule for out-of-print works affects a substantial
amount of works in GBS. By some estimates, the majority of works in
GBS, some 70 percent of the database, consists of out-of-print works.301
The out-of-print works utilized under the settlement are limited to works
registered in the United States or published in the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Canada302—a limitation added to address European and
293. Id. at 2.
294. Id. at 4.
295. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 5.1(b).
296. Id. § 5.2.
297. Id. § 5.5.
298. Id. § 4.3(b)(i)(1).
299. See id. §§ 3.2–3.4. See also id. §§ 1.51–1.52, 1.91 (providing definitions for “Display
Books,” “Display Uses,” and “No Display Books,” respectively).
300. Ironically, if not perversely, under this arrangement, the people least likely to be able to opt
out (because they are unidentifiable or absent) must opt out to exclude their works from exploitation,
while the people most likely to be able to opt out (because they are identifiable or present) do not have
to do anything to prevent their works from being exploited.
301. See Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The Dead Souls of the Google Book Search
Settlement, 52 COMM. OF ACM, July 2009, at 28, 28 [hereinafter Samuelson, Dead Souls].
302. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 1.19 (definition of “book”).
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Asian objections to GBS.303
In addition, Google is allowed to exploit commercially its database
much more dramatically, including for out-of-print and orphan works,
through advertising,304 institutional subscriptions,305 and other forms of
monetization.306 Thus, under the settlement, not only is Google allowed to
make greater display of orphan and out-of-print works, but it is also
allowed to monetize the works with advertisements in preview uses307—a
big change from Google’s original practice of not running ads for snippet
views of works.308 The monetization plan is facilitated by the establishment
of a Book Rights Registry (“BRR”), a collecting-rights organization that
will serve as a clearinghouse through which Google and the authors and
publishers that register their works will share royalties for monetization of
the vast number of works in GBS309—with the rights holders receiving 63
percent of the royalties and Google receiving 37 percent.310 The original
proposal had even allowed Google and the identified rights holders to share
in the proceeds obtained from “orphan works” whose owners could not be
identified or found.311 After intense objections alleging a conflict of
interest,312 the parties changed the arrangement to limit the use of revenues
from such works to benefit the absent rights holders, along with the
designation of a fiduciary who would act on behalf of and attempt to locate
the absent rights holders.313
Comparing the GBS settlement to Google’s original claim of fair use
before the lawsuit is like comparing apples to oranges—or perhaps
303. See Posting of Danny Sullivan to Search Engine Land, http://searchengineland.com/revisedgoogle-book-settlement-filed-29814 (Nov. 14, 2009, 00:31 EST).
304. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 3.14 (“Google may display advertisements
on Preview Use pages and other Online Book Pages . . . .”).
305. See id. § 4.1(a) (detailing general guidelines for pricing of institutional subscriptions).
306. See id. § 4.2 (discussing consumer purchases). See also id. § 4.3(e) (discussing preview
uses); id. § 4.4 (discussing the allocation of revenues from advertising uses).
307. See id. §§ 3.14, 4.3.
308. See GOOGLE, THE FACTS ABOUT GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH (2006), available at
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/pdf/gbsoverview.pdf [hereinafter GBS Facts].
309. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 6.1.
310. See id. § 2.1(a).
311. Original GBS Settlement, supra note 32, §§ 2.1(a), 3.8(b), 6.1–6.3.
312. See First DOJ Objection, supra note 288, at 9–10. See also Samuelson, Dead Souls, supra
note 301, at 30; Chris Castle, Is Google’s Culture Grab Unstoppable?, REGISTER, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/12/31/chris_castle_google_books_and_beyond/; Pamela Samuelson,
Google Books Is Not a Library, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 13, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
pamela-samuelson/google-books-is-not-a-lib_b_317518.html; Pamela Samuelson, The Audacity of the
Google Book Search Settlement, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 10, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
pamela-samuelson/the-audacity-of-the-googl_b_255490.html [hereinafter Samuelson, The Audacity].
313. See Amended GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 6.3.
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watermelons to peanuts. As the DOJ recognized, the settlement is
tantamount to comprehensive legislation that has a huge scope and effect
on many people and issues.314 A finding of fair use in the GBS case, had
the issue been resolved, would have been a substantial legal development,
but it still could not have established a BRR or engineered the type of
monetization of the online book industry that the settlement contemplates.
But a finding of fair use would have offered at least two things that the
settlement does not. First, a fair use finding would have obviated the need
for any royalties to be paid or for permission to be obtained, which could
have benefited not only Google, but also other entities seeking to build
similar book search technologies. One major concern with the settlement is
that, although the BRR arrangement is nonexclusive, Google and book
publishers will have tremendous power to control the entire book search
industry with prices they set.315 The settlement now makes it even more
unlikely that another competing service will attempt to do what GBS set
out to do—make an online book search tool, with limited snippet views of
copyrighted works, supported by fair use. A competitor of Google must
either pay to enter the market or face a class action copyright lawsuit.
Second, a finding of fair use would have provided a better way to
balance the interests of absent rights holders of orphan and out-of-print
copyrighted works. Instead of the default of 20 percent display plus
monetization of their works, absent rights holders would have only snippets
of their works used without their permission—and without any direct
monetization. The noncommercialized snippet display of works in the
original GBS316 is more respectful of the absent rights holders than the
settlement’s contemplated 20 percent default use of out-of-print works in
potentially commercialized displays, sales, and subscriptions. Put simply,
the more extensive, commercialized uses of the orphan and out-of-print
works under the settlement are arguably not fair uses, while the limited,
314. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
315. See Press Release, Booksellers Association, Statement from the BA, Nov. 13, 2008,
available at http://www.thebookseller.com/documents/BA_Google_Statement.pdf (“As such a
dominant player in the online world, Google will now occupy a unique gateway position that, if abused,
could easily create a de facto monopoly.”). See generally Fred von Lohmann, Google Is Done Paying
Silicon Valley’s Legal Bills, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov. 14, 2008, at 5, available at 2008 WLNR 27146940
(“In essence, Google has left its former copyright adversaries to maul any competitors . . . .”). At least
the most objectionable clause in the original settlement—the so-called most favored nation clause—was
removed. It would have given Google the right to receive the same terms as any better offer the BRR
made with a competing service. See Original GBS Settlement, supra note 32, § 3.8(a).
316. See infra note 324 and accompanying text.
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noncommercialized snippet uses were fair uses.317
Thus, in evaluating how desirable the amended settlement is as a
whole, it is worth at least considering how strong Google’s fair use claim
was. As the analysis below shows, (1) the basic technology of GBS
constituted a technological fair use, in part because the verbatim copies of
copyrighted works are used only for creating and operating the search
technology, but with an output of the copyrighted works that is quite
limited—a “few snippets” of the copyrighted works318—to the public; and
(2) the more debatable question of fair use, however, concerns the digital
copies Google provided to the participating libraries putatively for archival
purposes.319
1. Factor One
First, the purpose of Google’s use of verbatim copies of the entirety of
millions of copyrighted works was to create and operate the new
technology of an online search tool that could search inside the texts of
millions of books.320 The purpose of creating a better technology to find
information is a legitimate technological fair use purpose, as several courts
have correctly found in other search engine cases.321 A public benefit may
undoubtedly be “reasonably perceived” from the GBS—it enables
members of the public to find information from millions of books that they
might not otherwise have been able to find. Moreover, it does so in a
way—with only limited viewing or snippets of the relevant texts for
searching, akin to a thumbnail for photographs—that arguably does not
317. See Samuelson, The Audacity, supra note 312 (concluding that the snippet view was a fair
use but that the settlement goes further to “give Google a license to commercialize all books owned by
the class”).
318. See Google Books, Google Books Library Project, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/
library.html (last visited May 1, 2010) (“When you click on a search result for a book from the Library
Project, you’ll see basic bibliographic information about the book, and in many cases, a few snippets—
a few sentences showing your search term in context.”).
319. See Band, supra note 70, at 18. Google states: “Each library will receive a digital copy of
every book we scan . . . from their respective collections. Each library will treat their copies in
accordance with copyright law.” Google Books, Books Help, http://books.google.com/support/bin/
answer.py?answer=43751 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (answering the question, “Do the libraries get a
copy of the book?”).
320. See Google Books, About Google Books, History, http://books.google.com/intl/en/
googlebooks/history.html (last visited May 1, 2010).
321. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 720–23 (9th Cir. 2007)
(considering an attempt to create a better online search technology); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 811, 818–20 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118–19 (D. Nev.
2006) (considering the development of search engine technology through the use of cached links). See
also Menell, supra note 37, at 1019–40 (discussing the historical policy in favor of allowing access to
knowledge, dating back to the Royal Library of Alexandria).
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supersede the purposes of the original. Indeed, because GBS also directs
readers where to buy the relevant book (if available) from bookstores along
with the search results,322 GBS adds value to the original works by
promoting the books. Although Google is commercial, the participation of
the many nonprofit educational and university institutions323 provides a
significant counterweight to the commerciality, as does the fact that GBS is
offered entirely for free on the Internet for everyone in the world to enjoy.
In addition, before the settlement, Google did not run ads on the snippet
view page of copyrighted works in the GBS.324 In short, the first factor cuts
in favor of fair use as to the copies used to create, operate, and supply the
output of GBS. The verbatim copies of the books are necessary to create
and operate a comprehensive search tool that helps readers find relevant
information, yet GBS provides only limited output of the works—mere
snippets of the works—to the public.
By contrast, Google’s dissemination of digital copies of the works to
the participating libraries and universities (whose books were digitized)
does not fall within the purposes of a technological fair use—to create or
operate a technology.325 As such, the ostensibly archival copies for the
libraries must be analyzed under a standard fair use analysis. On this
question, the issue is more debatable. Given the very detailed exemption in
the Copyright Act for library copying of works for archival and
replacement purposes, which requires as conditions for archiving that the
existing copy be damaged and that another copy of the work “cannot be
322. See Google Books Library Project, supra note 318 (“In all cases, you’ll see links directing
you to online bookstores where you can buy the book and libraries where you can borrow it.”).
323. The participating libraries include Bavarian State Library, Columbia University, Committee
on Institutional Cooperation (CIC), Cornell University Library, Harvard University, Ghent University
Library, Keio University Library, Lyon Municipal Library, National Library of Catalonia, New York
Public Library, Oxford University, Princeton University, Stanford University, University of California,
University Complutense of Madrid, University Library of Lausanne, University of Michigan,
University of Texas at Austin, University of Virginia, and University of Wisconsin–Madison. See
Google Books, Library Partners, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/partners.html (last visited May
1, 2010).
324. See GBS Facts, supra note 308.
325. One possible argument to the contrary is that the digital copies were part of the bargain to
persuade the libraries to participate in GBS. Therefore, one might argue that as a quid pro quo, the
library copies were necessary to create GBS. Jonathan Band contends that the library copies should be
considered “ancillary to the index copy; Google made the library copies as consideration for obtaining
access to the book for the purpose of making the index copy.” Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding
Road to the Google Books Settlement, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 257 (2010). Such
“bargain” uses fall outside the concept of creational uses and must, therefore, be analyzed under
standard fair use analysis. The library copies are not technologically necessary to create or operate
GBS.
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obtained at a fair price,”326 one might argue that Google’s library copies cut
against fair use—the need for archiving through copying does not yet
appear to be established. While it is possible that many of the books are no
longer obtainable at a fair price,327 it is still not clear whether the books
involved in GBS are actually damaged. Also, the systematic production of
archival copies for the libraries may resemble the infringement found in the
systematic making of journal copies for researchers to archive in American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.328
On the other hand, § 108 does not necessarily preclude a fair use
argument. Indeed, subsection (f) states, “Nothing in this section . . . in any
way affects the right of fair use.”329 Thus, § 108 is a floor, not a ceiling.
The more general fair use defense can still be invoked. Both § 108 and
§ 117, which provides an exemption for making archival copies for
computer programs, provide general support for the notion that some
archiving should be deemed permissible and reasonable under copyright
law.330 Moreover, it might be highly impractical and wasteful to require the
libraries to wait until their materials have deteriorated before they can
create and archive digital copies, especially when Google has already done
so using the libraries’ own books. By the time the works deteriorate, it may
well be too late. Unlike Texaco, the libraries here (with the exception of
Google being a commercial entity) are nonprofit educational institutions.331
And to the extent that it is still good law, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, though decided under the Copyright Act of 1909, did recognize fair
use in the context of institutional copying at the National Institutes of
Health and National Library of Medicine.332 In any event, the archival
copies fall outside my technological fair use framework and must be
analyzed under the standard fair use analysis.
326. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c)(1), (e) (2006). For archiving, § 108 requires that the reproduction be
“solely for the purpose of replacement of a copy or phonorecord that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or
stolen, or if the existing format in which the work is stored has become obsolete.” Id. § 108(c).
Subsection (h) does allow greater copying in digital form for preservation of copyrighted works in their
last twenty years of copyright, provided that the work in question is neither “subject to normal
commercial exploitation” nor obtainable at a reasonable price, and provided that the copyright owner
has not provided notice establishing otherwise. Id. § 108(h).
327. By one estimate, 70 percent of the books are out of print. See Samuelson, Dead Souls, supra
note 301, at 28.
328. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995).
329. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4).
330. See id. §§ 108, 117 (exemptions for certain archival copies).
331. Section 108 imposes a limitation in its exemption that the copying must be “made without
any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage.” Id. § 108(a)(1).
332. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
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2. Factor Two
Factor two, “the nature of the copyrighted work,”333 weighs less
heavily here for the copies used in GBS because they involve a
technological fair use. Because the library copies do not involve a
technological fair use, this factor may be applied in ordinary fashion for the
library copies (less leeway for copying of fictional works versus factual
works), although with verbatim copying, it probably does not make much
difference. A lot more will depend on whether the archival copy is deemed
to serve a legitimate purpose in factor one.
3. Factor Three
Factor three favors a finding of technological fair use for the copies
used in GBS. The copies of the works for GBS were tailored specifically
for the value-adding purpose of creating a comprehensive, inside-the-text
search tool that can provide a public benefit. Verbatim copies were used
only to create and operate GBS, but the output was limited to snippets of
the relevant works.334
It is more debatable, however, for the library digital copies. Verbatim
copies were disseminated to each participating library or university,
ostensibly for the purpose of archiving.335 If the purpose of these copies is
deemed to be questionable under factor one, or if a greater need for
archiving is required to be shown, then copying the entirety of works likely
cuts against fair use.
4. Factor Four
Factor four favors fair use for the copies used in GBS. GBS may add
value to the copyrighted works because, for each search result, it allows
people to find relevant sources and also lists where a book can be bought or
borrowed from a library.336 And GBS does so in a way that gives the reader
only a snippet of the relevant work. Although perhaps in some cases
browsing only a snippet of a book is enough to satisfy the reader, it would
be surprising if a snippet would be enough to satisfy most readers who are
looking for relevant books, especially given that GBS allows no snippet or
preview of dictionaries or reference books.337 Allowing readers to browse
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
See supra notes 308, 320 and accompanying text.
See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
See Band, supra note 70, at 17.
See Band, supra note 325, at 232.
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just one or two lines of a book seems unlikely to eat into the sales of the
work. Factor four thus raises the vexing problem of analyzing the effect on
the potential licensing of works for use in the emerging, but stilldeveloping, market of online book search tools. This question raises the
circularity problem for which courts have yet to devise a foolproof
solution. Doubters of fair use may point to the proposed registry in the
GBS Settlement (the BRR) as evidence that the copyright holders can
effectively receive royalties by licensing their works for inclusion in the
book search.338 This argument, I think, places too much stock on licensing
as the measure of fair use. In this case, the market for licensing is still
emerging and, as noted previously, the settlement itself raises serious
antitrust concerns. The settlement gets around the licensing problem for
copyrighted works only by the hocus pocus of a class action with absent,
unidentified authors given the “chance” to opt out of an agreement made by
others purportedly on their behalf.339
We must also consider the effect a finding against fair use might have
on the online book search market. Given the sheer amount of time, labor,
and books needed to create a comprehensive book search of the magnitude
Google envisions, a finding against fair use might jeopardize the entry of
others to undertake such a project. The cost of running a project of that
scale, with or without fair use, can be quite substantial. By one estimate,
GBS will cost $750 million to scan 30 million books.340 If transaction costs
are added, and if licenses must be obtained and royalties paid for inclusion
of the works in the book search, that will only add further expense. Given
the massive amount of resources needed, and the uncertain prospects of
making profits from a book search, it is not surprising that in 2008,
Microsoft pulled out of the Open Content Alliance, which is a similar book
search project that is to be supported by paid licenses to the copyright
holders for inclusion of their works.341
Granted, the verbatim library copies might conflict with a traditional
and well-established market of the copyright holders in selling books. But,
if 70 percent of the copyrighted books are out-of-print (and not
338. See id. at 263, 284–85.
339. See Grimmelmann, supra note 286, at 12 (“The critical hole in this argument is that this isn’t
a market that one can effectively negotiate in without the device of the class action lawsuit.”);
Samuelson, Dead Souls, supra note 301, at 29–30.
340. Band, supra note 325, at 228.
341. See Satyu Nadella, Book Search Winding Down, BING, May 23, 2008, http://www.bing.com/
community/blogs/search/archive/2008/05/23/book-search-winding-down.aspx?PageIndex=1. For more
on the Alliance, see Open Content Alliance, FAQ, http://www.opencontentalliance.org/faq/ (last visited
May 1, 2010).
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commercially exploited today), arguably little harm to the copyright
holders would result from allowing library copies of such out-of-print
books. Presumably, out-of-print books are not being commercially
exploited except perhaps in used bookstores, whose sales do not redound to
the copyright holders’ benefit anyway because of the first-sale doctrine.342
In sum, the factors support a finding of technological fair use for GBS.
However, the library copies are not for a technological purpose and should
be analyzed under standard fair use (with respectable arguments that could
be made on both sides).
B. AMAZON KINDLE’S TEXT-TO-SPEECH FUNCTION
In 2009, Amazon disabled a new feature on the Kindle e-book reader
that would have enabled it to have a computer-generated voice “read” a
digital work aloud.343 This text-to-speech function drew the ire of book
publishers that felt it might compete with audio books.344 As Paul Aitken,
executive director of the Authors Guild, stated, “They don’t have the right
to read a book out loud . . . . That’s an audio right, which is derivative
under copyright law.”345 In response, Amazon (itself a major provider of
audio books for book publishers) maintained that computer-generated
audio of digital books would not threaten the current audio books with
human voices.346 But, after receiving pressure from the Authors Guild,
Amazon backed down.347
In a statement, Amazon explained the reason for its about-face:
Kindle 2’s experimental text-to-speech feature is legal: no copy is made,
no derivative work is created, and no performance is being given. . . .
Nevertheless, we strongly believe many rights holders will be more
comfortable with the text-to-speech feature if they are in the driver’s
seat.
Therefore, we are modifying our systems so that rights holders can
decide on a title by title basis whether they want text-to-speech enabled
or disabled for any particular title. We have already begun to work on the
342. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (stating that “the owner of a particular copy . . . is entitled,
without authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy”).
343. Posting of Brad Stone, supra note 19.
344. See Greg Sandoval, Book Publishers Object to Kindle’s Text-to-Voice Feature, CNET NEWS,
Feb. 10, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10161104-93.html.
345. Geoffrey A. Fowler & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, New Kindle Audio Feature Causes a Stir,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2009, at B9.
346. See id.
347. See Posting of Brad Stone, supra note 19.
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technical changes required to give authors and publishers that choice.
With this new level of control, publishers and authors will be able to
decide for themselves whether it is in their commercial interests to leave
text-to-speech enabled. We believe many will decide that it is.348

Advocates for people who are blind or visually impaired, and those with
learning disabilities, protested the decision and criticized the Authors Guild
for limiting the new functionality that could have improved their lives.349
When considering the text-to-speech function under copyright law,
probably no violation of any exclusive right of the copyright holders
occurs. Although reading a book aloud is a performance,350 it is not a
public performance unless it is performed “at a place open to the public or
at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal
circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered.”351 It seems
unlikely that people would ordinarily use the Kindle in either way to read a
book to the public. Contrary to the Authors Guild’s suggestion, reading a
book aloud, without it being captured in any permanent form, is not within
the copyright holder’s right to make derivative works.352 If it were, parents
all across America would be violating copyright law by reading to their
children at night.
But even assuming for argument’s sake that the read-aloud function
violates one of the exclusive rights, it qualifies as a technological fair use
as discussed below.
1. Factor One
The Kindle’s performance of a copyrighted book is made for the
purpose of creating a text-to-speech function on the new, developing line of
348. Id.
349. Posting of Alex Pham to L.A. Times Technology Blog, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/
technology/2009/04/kindleblindreadaloud.html (Apr. 7, 2009, 16:30 EST).
350. See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 60 (1975) (“To ‘perform’ a work, under the definition in section
101, includes reading a literary work aloud . . . .”).
351. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing the definition of performing or displaying a work
“publicly”). The performance of the work by each individual Kindle does not involve transmissions to
multiple members of the public and thus does not constitute a public performance under the second
definition of “publicly.” See id. (defining publicly also to mean “to transmit or otherwise communicate
a performance or display of the work to a place [described in the first definition of ‘publicly’] or to the
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at
different times”).
352. In order for a derivative work to be created, courts require that it be in some “concrete or
permanent form.” See Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Lewis
Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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digital book readers—a clear technological fair use purpose.353 The
functionality adds value to the e-book reader and the original work by
allowing people to experience books in two different ways: by sight and by
sound. For people who are blind or have learning disabilities, the added
functionality may make digital books dramatically more accessible. To the
extent the text-to-speech can serve underserved populations, such as the
blind and people with learning disabilities, the public benefits. This result is
consistent with the Senate Judiciary Committee report’s view on fair use:
“[T]he making of a single copy or phonorecord by an individual as a free
service for a blind person would properly be considered a fair use under
section 107.”354 For other readers of books, the added functionality of the
Kindle may increase their desire to buy books in the first place, given the
new convenience of listening to a book at moments when reading is
unavailable. Clearly, a public benefit may reasonably be perceived in
giving consumers greater functionality in enjoying books. Factor one
favors fair use.
2. Factor Two
Because of the legitimate technological fair use purpose, the nature of
the copyrighted works does not weigh heavily in the analysis.
3. Factor Three
The amount and substantiality of the work copied is neutral or slightly
favors fair use. The text-to-speech function does not create or distribute an
audio copy of the work; it merely performs the work. The amount
performed can potentially be the entire work, but the Kindle user decides
how much to listen to. Although the Kindle involves both operational and
output uses of the work, the output is the ephemeral performance of the
work. Arguably, such evanescent performances enhance the user
experience in a way similar to what constituted fair use in Galoob with the
game enhancer’s enhancement of the display of video games.355
353. See supra Part IV.A.1.a.
354. See S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 66 (1975). Congress enacted an exemption for the blind in
§ 110(8), which would not apply here because it does not involve a qualifying entity. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 110(8) (2006) (exemption subject to the condition that “the performance is made without any purpose
of direct or indirect commercial advantage and its transmission is made through the facilities of: (i) a
governmental body; or (ii) a noncommercial educational broadcast station . . . ; or (iii) a radio subcarrier
authorization . . . ; or (iv) a cable system”).
355. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 968 (finding that the game enhancement software “merely enhances
the audiovisual displays (or underlying data bytes) that originate in Nintendo game cartridges[, but]
[t]he altered displays do not incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some concrete or
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4. Factor Four
Factor four cuts in favor of fair use or is at least neutral. The Kindle’s
reading a book aloud without creating a permanent copy is the functional
equivalent of a person reading a book aloud—an activity that, if done
nonpublicly, does not fall within the copyright holder’s market. Moreover,
copyright holders receive money from Kindle’s popularity through
royalties obtained from sales of digital books. And, of course, the copyright
holders always have the power to charge more money for e-books.
Although the Authors Guild may argue that the text-to-speech
function substitutes for audio books, that is not necessarily the case. Audio
books are permanent, audio (nontext) copies narrated typically by the
authors themselves,356 celebrities, or people with mellifluous voices. Audio
books are sold for multiple formats on CD and cassettes, or for digital
download on MP3 players, thus reaching a much larger potential audience
than the estimated 1.49 million Kindle owners.357 Given this relatively
small size of the Kindle audience (at least currently), it seems speculative
to conclude that the text-to-speech function would have a major dampening
effect on sales of audio books. Many consumers of audio books probably
do not even own a Kindle. And for the ones that do, the Kindle has a
computer-generated voice,358 which may be less appealing than human
voices on an audio book. Also, it is worth remembering that the book
market consists of multiple formats, with print being the primary one.
Audio books represent only a small percentage of U.S. publishers’
revenues. In 2008, U.S. publishers earned $24.3 billion, only $172 million
of which were from the sale of audio books.359 The biggest market is the
sale of adult and juvenile books, totaling $8.1 billion in the United
States.360
Thus, if there is competition among book formats, it is more likely to
be between traditional books and e-books for reading, not listening.
Already digital books for the Kindle are selling at 35 percent of the number
permanent form” (emphasis omitted)).
356. For example, Sarah Palin narrates her recent biography, Going Rogue. See SARAH PALIN,
GOING ROGUE: AN AMERICAN LIFE (2009) (audio CD-ROM, narrated by author).
357. Posting of Mitch Ratcliffe to ZDNet, http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ratcliffe/?p=486 (Dec. 26, 2009,
21:02 PST).
358. See Fowler & Trachtenberg, supra note 345.
359. Press Release, Ass’n of Am. Publishers, Industry Statistics 2008: AAP Reports Book Sales
Estimated at $24.3 Billion in 2008 (Mar. 31, 2009), available at http://www.publishers.org/main/
IndustryStats/indStats_02.htm.
360. Id.
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of print books sold for the same title on Amazon.361 Whether the digital
book market will be complementary or competitive to the traditional book
market is hard to predict—much probably depends on the continued
“stickiness” of, or consumer preference for, printed books.362 Yet
ultimately that question is irrelevant to the fair use analysis for the simple
reason that copyright holders have authorized the sale of e-books for the
Kindle. In other words, authors have chosen to allow the possibility that
their e-books might compete with their own printed books in the market.
Finally, a finding against fair use would prevent Amazon from
offering the text-to-speech function on the Kindle without getting licenses
on a title-by-title basis. Although such a result might not dampen sales for
the Kindle itself, it may retard the development of not only the text-tospeech function, but other new functions that do not have the blessing of
the Authors Guild or publishing industry. This kind of entanglement of the
Guild in controlling speech technologies today, what Amazon called a
“new level of control,”363 runs dangerously close to the pernicious control
the Stationers’ Company exercised over the printing press.364 A finding of
technological fair use would provide an important buffer between today’s
guild of publishers and authors and the development of new speech
technologies.
VI. ADDRESSING CONCERNS
This part addresses a few concerns that my proposal may raise—
specifically, whether this framework provides the proper balance, how it
fits into the overall copyright system, and international challenges.
A. TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE PROTECTION OF SPEECH TECHNOLOGIES?
Some copyright holders may object to my proposal as giving too much
protection to uses of their works in speech technologies—in effect arguing
that the technologies are being subsidized by free uses of their works.
Specifically, copyright industries may disagree with my argument in favor
of according greater leeway for creational and operational uses—especially
361. Erick Schonfeld, For Books Available on Kindle, Sales Are Now Tracking at 35 Percent of
Print Sales, TECHCRUNCH, May 6, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/05/06/for-books-availableon-kindle-sales-are-now-tracking-at-35-percent-of-print-sales/. Amazon’s digital book sales will bring
in an estimated $189 to $520 million in revenues. Id.
362. See Nicholson Baker, A New Page: Can the Kindle Really Improve on the Book?, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 3, 2009, at 24; Sara Nelson, E-Dreaming, PUBLISHERS WKLY., June 30, 2008.
363. See Posting of Brad Stone, supra note 19.
364. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
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those involving verbatim copying. After all, copyright industries might
argue, a copy is a copy, and copyright gives the holder the right to copy.
Conversely, some critics or technology companies may criticize my
proposal as not protective enough of technologies, especially those
involving verbatim output uses of copyrighted works (such as for personal
use) that are accorded comparatively less leeway on my CreationOperation-Output spectrum.
As to the first objection by copyright industries, my response is
twofold. First, fair use presumes that not all copies are infringing, so it is a
nonstarter to say that a copy is a copy or to assert that permission must
always be obtained. Second, the First Amendment and the Copyright and
Patent Clause require some breathing room for the development of speech
technologies unencumbered by the prospect that copyright holders can
dictate the design of those technologies or else sue the developer to stop the
technology in question. This does not mean that copyright industries have
no role in shaping new speech technologies through informal dealings or
dialogue with the technology sector. Both sectors could benefit from
collaborative joint enterprises that attempt to give the public more options
and products instead of the two sides wasting resources on threats of
litigation or litigation itself. But, ultimately, the copyright industries should
not have a “veto” over the speech technologies. The Creation-OperationOutput spectrum is a balance of competing interests and involves some
tradeoffs for all sides—with the goal of serving the public interest foremost
in mind consistent with the Copyright Clause and First Amendment. The
balance I have struck is faithful to how the Supreme Court has approached
copyright-technology cases.365
The technology companies’ objections can be addressed by my second
response above: a balance must be struck between rewarding copyright
holders and promoting the development of speech technologies. My
365. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005) (“The
more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the
administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff.” (citation omitted)); id. at 941
(“The [Sony] case struck a balance between the interests of protection and innovation by holding that
the product’s capability of substantial lawful employment should bar the imputation of fault and
consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts of others.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance
between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce.”). Copyright holders have the opportunity to stop technological uses of their works by
inventing and patenting the underlying technology in question. In order to stop purely functional uses of
their works in new technologies, copyright holders must patent the new functions.
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framework of technological fair use provides greater breathing room for
speech technologies, but in a way that balances the competing interest of
copyright holders. Although I have made the fair use factors more specific
to technology cases, given fair use’s history and case law, some factspecific weighing of these factors is inevitable. Nonetheless, my framework
offers an improvement over the status quo. It provides greater guidance and
breathing room than before. For example, instead of uncertain claims of
fair use, both Google and Amazon have pretty clear claims of fair use
under my framework. Had courts already recognized technological fair use
as a doctrine, Google and Amazon might well have continued to develop
their technologies as they originally intended, instead of caving in to the
demands of copyright industries.
B. ONLY ONE PART OF THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
One must also bear in mind that technological fair use is only one part
of the puzzle in analyzing the relationship between technologies and
copyright law. Readers should not inflate the effect that such a doctrine
alone can have on innovation of speech technologies, or expect that my
framework should resolve every single controversy raised by a speech
technology under copyright law.
Within the copyright system, technological fair use is only one part of
copyright law’s approach to new technologies. Indeed, new technologies
are addressed in a number of ways, not just under fair use. There are
(1) findings of no infringement for specific technologies in various
cases,366 which obviates the need for analyzing fair use;367 (2) doctrinal and
statutory exemptions for technologies, such as the Sony and DMCA safe
366. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008);
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
367. This approach dates back to some of the oldest technology cases. See White-Smith Music
Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (holding that perforated musical sheets for pianolas did not
constitute a copy), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102(a), 90 Stat.
2541, 2544–45 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006)); Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F.
584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888) (holding that perforated paper for organettes was not an infringement of
copyrighted sheet music), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 643 (1892). See also Teleprompter Corp. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (holding that cable television retransmissions of
copyrighted television broadcasts without copyright holders’ permission did not constitute a public
performance of those works and was thus not an infringement); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398–401 (1968) (holding that a cable television provider’s transmission
of copyrighted motion pictures without a license did not constitute a public performance within the
meaning of the Copyright Act). Likewise, Congress may step in and tailor an exemption or compulsory
license related to a new technology, as was the case with cable retransmission of broadcast television
programs. See 17 U.S.C. § 111; Wu, supra note 134, at 322–23.
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harbors;368 (3) compulsory licenses related to technologies;369 (4) the basic
standards of liability, including Grokster’s active inducement claim;370 and
(5) customs and industry practices for many technologies that are never
tested in court.371
Further study should be devoted to analyzing how these different
components relate and how they might be revised or tailored to provide a
more overarching and systematic approach to the difficult issues raised by
speech technologies and their continual intersection with copyright law.
For example, I would characterize (1) and (2) above as examples of quasitechnological fair use in which the results reached were equivalent to a
finding of fair use, thus allowing the technology in question to continue.372
Future research should examine these cases for a more complete picture of
copyright’s treatment of speech technologies.
C. INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES
Another major challenge for technological fair use is international:
how can technological fair use operate effectively in a global market,
where technologies often have an international reach? While the United
States recognizes an open-ended fair use doctrine, other countries typically
rely on specific exemptions in their copyright acts.373 Thus, even if U.S.
courts do recognize technological fair use, technology developers must still
face the prospect that their speech technologies will not receive similar
treatment in other countries. Of course, if the developer can easily divide
up its market distribution by countries (choosing only to enter those
markets with favorable copyright law), the legal problem is solved—
though consumers in other countries may suffer in being denied access to
the speech technology. But, sometimes, market differentiation is difficult, if
not impossible, especially for Internet applications.
For example, although U.S. courts have recognized a fair use in the
use of thumbnail photos for visual search engines, a German lower court
ruled that such thumbnail photos constitute copyright infringement in
368. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 442; 17 U.S.C. § 512. See also supra note 231 and accompanying
text.
369. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111.
370. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935–37. See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding no direct liability for Google’s inline linking or framing of
copyrighted images stored on third-party servers under the “server” test).
371. See Lee, Warming Up, supra note 128, at 1476–79 (analyzing informal copyright practices).
372. See also supra note 231 and accompanying text.
373. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 293–
94 (2001).
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Germany (which does not recognize fair use), a decision that was later
overturned.374 Instead of fair use, the German Federal Court of Justice
relied on implied consent (by website owners) to find Google image search
did not violate German copyright law.375 Although the result in Germany
eventually came out in favor of allowing image search technology, the case
points to the lack of international consensus on determining exemptions to
copyright. Likewise, even if GBS were recognized as a fair use in the
United States, it too would likely face challenges in other countries—as is
evident by the number of countries and foreign copyright holders that have
objected to the proposed settlement.376 Indeed, a Paris court ruled recently
(after the revised settlement had been struck in the U.S. case) that GBS
violates French copyright law with respect to certain works of French
origin.377 The international challenge of providing workable breathing
room for speech technologies on a global scale is a topic that deserves far
greater discussion than I can devote here. For present purposes at least, my
theory of technological fair use is limited to recognition in the United
States, where the tradition of the freedom of the press is strongest.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the start of the twenty-first century has witnessed already the
374. The Regional Court of Hamburg found the use of thumbnail images in search indexes
violates the German Copyright Act. See LG Hamburg, 9/26/2008, 308 O 42/06. Some German
commentators have recognized the need to incorporate greater flexibility in statutory exemptions under
German copyright law to deal with and allow new technologies. See, e.g., Matthias Leistner, The Role
and Design of Limitations and the Need for Flexibility: Image Search on the Web as a Topical
Example, in DOES ONE SIZE FIT ALL?, Proceedings of the ATRIP Congress 2008, EE, (A. Kur ed.,
forthcoming 2010). Eventually, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH)
overturned the lower court decision and ruled in favor of Google based on the notion that the website
owner impliedly consented to allow her photographs to be used in Google image search. See BGH, I ZR
69/08; Karin Matussek, Google Wins ‘Thumbnail’ Images Ruling in German Court (Update 2),
BLOOMBERG, April 29, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-29/google-wins-thumbnailimages-ruling-in-german-court-update2-.html.
375. See Matussek, supra note 374.
376. See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere, In China, Objections to Google’s Book Scans, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
31, 2009, at B4 (discussing objections by French and German governments, as well as by Chinese
authors); Kelly Fiveash, Germany Says ‘Nein’ to Google Book Deal, REGISTER, Sept. 2, 2009,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/09/02/germany_opposes_google_books_settlement/
(discussing
opposition from the German government); Honor Mahony, Europe’s Heated Reaction to Google Books,
BUS. WK., Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/sep2009/gb2009099_
774179.htm (discussing the criticism from European publishers, booksellers, and authors to Google’s
plan); Stanley Pignal, France to Oppose Google Book Scheme, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a38e5268-9bdd-11de-b214-00144feabdc0.html (discussing opposition by
the French government).
377. Matthew Saltmarsh, Paris Court Orders Google to Stop Digitizing French Books and Pay
Damages, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, at B3.
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emergence of many new and wondrous speech technologies, copyright law
must be prepared to handle difficult questions posed by new technological
uses of copyrighted works. This Article offers a framework intended to
provide better guidance for courts in handling the difficult and complex
analytical issues posed by technological fair use claims. Such guidance is
needed because so much is at stake in these cases—not only the legality of
a speech technology, but also potentially billions of dollars in growth to the
U.S. economy and new technological innovations that can transform
people’s lives.

